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~E purpose of this Article is to effect a synthesis of law and econom-
is that is acceptable to both lawyers and economists; in other words,
r1.aosynthesis acceptable to those who think like1 and have values
2 of
lawyers as well as those who think like3 and have values4 of economists.
Section One discusses the criticisms that lawyers and economists make of
each other's values and methodology, and outlines a way to synthesize these
conflicting values and different methodologies.
* Professor of Economics, The City University of New York; Adjunct Professor of
Law, Brooklyn Law School. Harvard University, B.A., 1962; Stanford Law School, J.D.,
1967; Columbia University, Ph.D., 1975. I wish to thank the students in my Law & Econom-
ics classes at Brooklyn Law School, Spring, 1989 and Spring, 1990; their unremitting criticism
of economic analysis of law for its nearly total disregard of equitable considerations continu-
ally forced me to rethink my assumptions and approach.
1. "The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It is reasoning from
case to case." The accompanying footnote contains a quotation from Aristotle who concludes
deductive reasoning is reasoning from whole to part, inductive reasoning is reasoning from
part to whole, and reasoning by example is reasoning from part to part. E. LEVI, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1948). Each profession of lawyers and economists select
and organize the raw data of reality in terms of concepts and purposes accepted by the profes-
sion. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 61-64 (1956-57).
2. "[I]f wealth maximization is only to be an instrumental value.., then there must be
some independent moral claim for the rights that wealth maximizati6n recommends. These
rights cannot have a moral claim on us simply because recognizing those rights advances
wealth." R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 252 (1985).
3. "As economists know, thinking about a problem like an economist means building a
'model' of it---either verbally, graphically, or mathematically-to distill the essence of the rela-
tionships being studied." A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS xiii
(2d ed. 1989). "Ihe basic methodology used in microeconomics... is much the same as that
used in any other type of scientific analysis. The basic procedure is the formulation of models.
A model is composed of a number of assumptions from which conclusions-or predictions-
are deduced." E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 13-14 (6th
ed. 1988).
4. "[Tihe things that wealth makes possible-not only luxury goods but also leisure and
modern medicine, and even departments of philosophy-are major ingredients of most peo-
ple's happiness, so that wealth maximization is an important--conceivably the only effective-
social instrument of utility maximization." R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14-15
(3d ed. 1986).
Tihe term efficiency will refer to the relationship between the aggregate benefits
of a situation and the aggregate costs of the situation; the term equity will refer
to the distribution of income among individuals. In other words, efficiency cor-
responds to "the size of the pie," while equity has to do with how it is sliced.
Economists traditionally concentrate on how to maximize the size of the pie,
leaving to others---such as legislators-the decision how to divide it.
A. POLINSKY, supra note 3, at 7 (footnotes omitted).
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Section Two demonstrates that total social wealth depends upon both dis-
tributional equity and efficiency, and not just efficiency alone. After this
demonstration, the value conflict between lawyers and economists is easily
resolved by construction of a criterion, called "wealth maximization", which
is both efficient and has a strong claim to distributional equity.5
Section Three contains a synthesis of the legal and economic methodolo-
gies; that is, general versus particular and efficiency versus equity. A meth-
odological synthesis, called the hard case paradigm, employs the bilateral
monopoly model; this model is used in an extended analysis of a representa-
tive hard common law case. Such a case presents problems because issues of
distributional equity and efficiency are interrelated and difficult to disentan-
gle. The bilateral monopoly model is able to explain when and how distribu-
tional equity and efficiency considerations are related in such hard common
law cases.
A true synthesis of law and economics, as opposed to an economic analy-
sis of law,6 must include a method for analyzing distributional consequences
as well as efficiency consequences of decisions by courts and legislatures.
Section Four contains a discussion of the principles by which government
(courts and legislatures) can achieve maximum social wealth. Section Five
concludes the article.
A. Resolving The Value Conflict Between Lawyers and Economists
A major impediment to the construction of a synthesis of law and eco-
nomics concerns the clash of values between lawyers and economists. Law-
yers often react with hostility to the economic analysis of law. This hostility
exists because lawyers cannot accept that the concept of efficiency, which
economists developed in order to analyze voluntary transactions between in-
dividuals in competitive markets, should be the criterion to decide all legal
issues of a predominantly economic character, 7 most of which involve gov-
ernmental coercion of individuals in dispute (usually nonmarket) situations.8
Lawyers object to the use of the efficiency criterion as the rationale for gov-
ernmental coercion because the efficiency concept eschews considerations of
horizontal equity and distributional fairness, concepts that lawyers regard as
5. We may try to show that the decisions that seem to maximize wealth are re-
quired, not as instrumental decisions seeking to produce a certain state of affairs,
of social wealth, utility, or any other goal of policy, but rather as decisions of
principle enforcing a plausible conception of fairness. We might aim, that is, at
an explanation of principle, instead of an explanation of policy.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 266.
6. See R. POSNER, supra note 4.
7. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 550-
551 (1980); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REV. 451, 462-464 (1974); R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at ch. 13.
8. This doing of something about disputes, this doing of it reasonably, is the busi-
ness of law. And the people who have the doing in charge, whether they be
judges or sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers, are officials of the law. What
these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.
K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1960); See Rose-Ackerman, Law and Economics:
Paradigm, Politics, or Philosophy, LAW AND ECONOMICS 234-35 (N. Mercuro ed. 1989).
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indispensable elements in the concept of law. Because of this value conflict
between lawyers and economists, when lawyers compare their conception of
law (which includes considerations of distributional equity) to an econo-
mist's efficiency analysis of law, lawyers can be excused for thinking that the
efficiency view relates to their view as the surrealistic distortion of a Salvador
Dali painting relates to reality.
Economists, on the other hand, often criticize lawyers for refusing to ac-
cept the implication of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics,9 which
implies that any attempt to interfere in competitive markets based on mo-
tives of distributional equity is self defeating because such interference im-
pairs the efficiency of markets. Second, economists criticize lawyers on the
ground that lawyers often espouse absolutist values in a morally relative
world in which benefits from achieving any value must be weighed against
costs, in terms of alternative values or opportunity cost, 10 that must be sacri-
ficed in order to achieve the former value.
Consider the following: An economist would argue whether and to what
extent government should subsidize litigation, by charging low filing fees for
law suits so that ostensibly every person can have his or her day in court,
depends upon a determination that using government resources to subsidize
litigation is superior (based upon some criterion) to using these resources to
subsidize competing ends such as education, medical care, poverty reduc-
tion, or even national defense. An economist also would argue that before
the state makes a decision to redistribute income via an increase in welfare
payments, the purpose of which is to alleviate poverty and promote the value
of equality, one must ask: first, whether the benefit from such payments is
not outweighed by the disincentive effects on work effort from such pay-
ments, both to those who receive them and to those who must be taxed in
order to provide them; and second, whether a more cost effective method
exists by which to reduce poverty, for example increased spending on educa-
tion or social services, such as free prenatal care or Head Start programs. II
In Section Two, a synthesis of these competing values of lawyers and
economists is effected by demonstrating that total social wealth is a function
of both efficiency and distributional equity. Once this demonstration is
made, it is easy to establish that a criterion for evaluating governmental ac-
tion of a predominantly economic character, wealth maximization, will have
the desired properties of efficiency and a strong claim to distributional
equity.
B. The Hard Case Paradigm: A Synthesis of the General and Particular,
Efficiency and Equity
A second major impediment to the construction of a synthesis of law and
economics is the fact that both lawyers and economists maintain that the
9. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
10. "Cost to the economist is 'opportunity cost'-the benefit forgone by employing a re-
source in a way that denies its use to someone else." R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 6.
11. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-709 (1983 & Supp. 1990).
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other profession's methodological approach to law is superficial. With re-
spect to the lawyers' methodological criticism of economists, a thoughtful
legal scholar has stated that economic analysis of law is "insightful but not
useful."'1 2 In the specific cases that lawyers argue and courts decide, eco-
nomic theory's interpretation 13 is relevant and insightful but often does not
fit 14 well enough to be material or dispositive. Why not?
One reason usually given is that economic theory, which is methodologi-
cally deductive and stated in terms of the general case, may not apply in
particular cases if the assumptions underlying the theory differ significantly
from the facts. If a theory's assumptions do not fit the facts, there is no
guarantee that the interpretation of the facts implied by the theory is rele-
vant and material.15 In Lochner v. New York 16 Justice Holmes expressed
this view in his epigramatic style: "General propositions do not decide con-
crete cases."' 7 It is well known, however, that one of the problems with
12. Conversation with Professor Arron Twerski of Brooklyn Law School (1988).
13. [L]egal practice is an exercise in interpretation not only when lawyers inter-
pret particular documents or statutes but generally .... [We can improve our
understanding of law by comparing legal interpretation with interpretation in
other fields of knowledge, particularly literature. I also expect that law, when
better understood, will provide a better grasp of what interpretation is in
general.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 146. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE ch. 2 (1986).
14.
[Tihere are two dimensions along which it must be judged whether a theory
provides the best justification of available legal materials: the dimension of fit
and the dimension of political morality. The dimension of fit supposes that one
political theory is pro tanto a better justification than another if, roughly speak-
ing, someone who held that theory would, in its service, enact more of what is
settled than would someone who held the other.... It will be rare, I think, that
many lawyers will agree that neither provides a better fit than the other.
R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 143 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); R. DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 230-232 (1986).
15. "[The confidence of economists in the science of political economy is based on direct
and rather casual confirmation of its assumptions, not on serious test of their implications."
Hausman, Economic Methodology in a Nutshell, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 116-117 (1989).
Hausman attributes this view to John Stuart Mill and concludes that this is the "view to
which, I suggest, most orthodox economists (regardless of what they may say in methodologi-
cal discussion) still subscribe." Id. at 117 (footnote omitted). With respect to the instrumen-
talist view that theories should be tested by whether their predictions are accurate rather than
by whether their assumptions are realistic, expressed in M. FRIEDMAN, THE METHODOLOGY
OF PosITIvE ECONOMICS (1953), Hausman says:
Unrealistic assumptions (in the sense of false assumptions) will always result in
false predictions, except, perhaps, in the case of assumptions concerning unob-
servables....
Yet even if one fully grants Friedman's view of the goals of science, one
should still be concerned about the realism of assumptions. For there is no good
way to know what to try when a prediction fails or whether to employ a theory
in a new application without judging one's assumptions. Without assessments of
realism (approximate truth) of assumptions, the process of theory modification
would be hopelessly inefficient and the application of theories to new circum-
stances nothing but arbitrary guesswork.
Hausman, supra, at 144, 149-150. "It will be a step forward when economists come to regard
Friedman's essay only as an historically interesting document." Id. at 124.
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. Id. 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) "The decision will depend on a
judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise."
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Holmes' style is that the deceptive simplicity of his epigrams conceals latent
ambiguities. Therefore, let us examine Holmes' epigram set out in Lochner
more critically.
Lawyers are most concerned about hard and concrete cases.18 Because
reasonable people differ with respect to which conflicting principles or theo-
ries should prevail, these hard cases often rise to the top of the legal system,
the highest appellate courts. Hard cases are interstitial in character in the
sense that they are in between cases that clearly ought to be decided by one
principle and those that clearly ought to be decided by another conflicting
principle.
Dworkin 19 would probably argue, I think correctly, that a literal reading
of Holmes' epigram in Lochner is wrong; general propositions or principles
do decide concrete hard cases. 20 The problem in hard cases is that reason-
able people can differ as to which of several conflicting general principles
ought to control.2 1 The decision maker must choose the principle which
provides an interpretation that both fits the specific case and provides the
best justification for previous decisions, as far as that is possible, so that the
law is "the best it can be."'22 On the other hand, if Holmes' epigram means
that general principles often cannot be dispositive of a hard case, it is cor-
rect. As to this proposition, Dworkin would probably agree.23 Let us inter-
pret Holmes' epigram in Lochner in this second sense.
In Lochner the United States Supreme Court held that a New York law
which prohibited bakery employees from working more than ten hours per
day or sixty hours per week violated the Constitution of the United States.
24
In the context of early twentieth century jurisprudence, Lochner represented
a hard case - it involved a conflict between the principle of competitive
markets, which maintains that individuals should be free to make contracts
of their choice, and a principle that government has a right to make laws
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.25 In dissent, Justice
18. "[A] hard case, when no settled rule dictates a decision either way .... R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 83 (1977).
19. Id.
20. "Judicial review insures that the most fundamental issues of political morality will
finally be set out and debated as issues of principle and not political power alone .... " R.
DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 70.
21. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 15-30 (1986).
22. "The judge's decision - his postinterpretive conclusions - must be drawn from an
interpretation that both fits and justifies what has gone before, so far as that is possible." Id. at
239. "I offer...this general and very abstract characterization of interpretation: it aims to
make the object or practice being interpreted the best it can be." Id. at 77.
23. Dworkin says:
I have insisted that in most hard cases there are right answers to be hunted by
reason and imagination. Some critics have thought I meant that in these cases
one answer could be proved right to the satisfaction of everyone, even though I
insisted from the start that this is not what I meant, that the question whether
we can have reason to think an answer right is different from the question
whether it can be demonstrated to be right
R. DWORKIN. LAW'S EMPIRE viii-ix (1986); R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at ch. 5.
24. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
25. "A reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score of health." Id. at 76.
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Holmes argued that general principles or theories of competitive markets are
not dispositive as to whether particular social welfare legislation is constitu-
tional nor is good economic policy. 26 Holmes argued, therefore, that Con-
gress should be free to choose between the two principles. 27
Although involving the constitutionality of a statute, Lochner is similar to
the hard common law case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 2s These cases
have as a central issue the question whether government action by legisla-
tures or courts, which alters the distributional consequences of economic
activity, will impair efficiency or increase social wealth. 29 As shown below,
in hard common law cases, issues of distributional equity and efficiency are
interrelated and difficult to disentangle. In short, hard common law cases
are hard precisely because they involve potential conflicts between principles
of equity and efficiency.
A second reason economic analysis of hard common law cases often does
not provide an interpretation that fits well enough to be either material or
dispositive is the fact that most economists eschew issues of distributional
equity even though distributional equity-efficiency conflicts are the essence
of hard common law cases and much legislation. In order to justify the
apparent total disinterest in the distributional implications of their theories,
economists make assumptions about the relationship between distributional
equity and efficiency in different institutional contexts that are often mutu-
ally inconsistent and lacking in rigor. Consider the assumptions economists
make about the relationship between income distribution and efficiency in
three institutional contexts: competitive markets, courts, and legislatures.
Competitive markets are efficient, regardless of the income distribution
resulting from such markets. Any governmental interference in competitive
markets for the purpose of achieving goals of distributional equity is self
defeating because it impairs the raison d'etre of competitive markets, effi-
ciency. 30 The First Theorem of Welfare Economics implies these two state-
ments which are not controversial. 31
When analyzing nonmarket decisions in hard common law cases that have
significant distributional consequences, such as the declaration or alteration
of property rights, as exemplified by nuisance in tort law,32 eminent domain
26. Id. at 75 (emphasis in original). "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.... [A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or
of laissez faire." Id.
27. Id.
28. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970). See infra notes 171-83 and accompanying
text.
29. Sections 2, 3,.and 4, demonstrate that government action by courts or legislatures may
alter distributional consequences of economic activity in a way which will increase total social
wealth.
30. W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 64-69 (4th ed.
1988); E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 42-47.
31. H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMIcS: A MODERN APPROACH 495 (1987)
See infra notes 67-75 and notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
32. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 15 (5th ed. 1984).
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in property law,3 3 and specific performance issues in contract law, 34 econo-
mists assume that distribution and efficiency are totally separate and in-
dependent of each other. The Coase Theorem claims that "[i]f transaction
costs are zero the structure of the law does not matter because efficiency will
result in any case."' 35 Articles by Baumo136 and Cooter37 have proven false
this claim of the Coase Theorem, that decisions by courts altering property
rights have distributional effects only or that distribution and efficiency are
independent of each other.
When analyzing the economic impact of legislative decisions, the purposes
of which are to achieve greater income equality through government taxes
and transfers, economists often make disingenuous statements to the effect
that a "trade-off" between distribution and efficiency exists.38 Such state-
ments are disingenuous in two senses. First, economists justify ignoring the
distributional consequences of competitive markets because the Second The-
orem of Welfare Economics 39 implies that legislatures can, in principle, deal
with issues of distributional equity separately and independently from issues
of efficiency.40 At the same time, however, economists maintain that in
practice legislative action invariably results in a trade-off between distribu-
tion and efficiency.4 1 Second, the proponents of these statements usually al-
lege a trade-off between the degree of income inequality and total social
wealth.42 In this sense, the statement is disingenuous because the perceived
trade-off is based upon an improper definition (misspecification) of the vari-
ables and functional relationships involved. Section Two will show that
when correctly specified, total social wealth is a function of both distribu-
tional equity and efficiency.4 3 In this context, a movement toward income
equality will, up to a point, increase social wealth. Beyond that point, how-
ever, further movement toward income equality will decrease social wealth.
On the other hand, economists may make three primary criticisms of the
legal method of analysis. First, no matter how fact-specific and closely rea-
soned legal analysis of hard cases appears to be, legal analysis is based on the
sandy foundations of semantics and linguistics, which contain all sorts of
33. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 49-53.
34. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS ch. 12B (1982).
35. Cooter, The Cost of Coase, XI J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16 (1982) (citing Polinsky, Eco-
nomic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analy-
sis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1165 [sic], 1655, 1665 (1974)).
36. Baumol, On Taxation and Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 312, 315
(1972).
37. Cooter, supra note 35, at 1, 15. See infra notes 230-49 and accompanying text.
38. A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE OFF 1 (1975); P. SAMUEL-
SON & W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 809-13 (13th ed. 1989).
39. "The Second Welfare Theorem implies that the problems of distribution and efficiency
can be separated." H. VARIAN, supra note 31, at 502-03. See A. POLINSKY, supra note 3, at
ch. 2.
40. See infra notes 90-109 and accompanying text.
41. See supra note 39 and infra note 42.
42. "Calabresi speaks of a trade-off or mix of wealth and distribution." R. DWORKIN,;
supra note 2, at 268. Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 553, n.1 (1980).
43. See infra notes 64-138 and accompanying text.
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unanalyzed value judgments, biases and hidden logical traps; consider Marx-
ist," legal realist,45 critical legal studies, 46 feminist,47 and deconstruction-
ist"S criticisms of law. Economists can argue that their value judgments and
logic, however much criticized, are at least explicit and rigorous.49 Second,
economists can assert that legal analysis, unlike economic analysis, which
elucidates the deep underlying structure of law, emphasizes superficial dis-
continuities. Legal analysis tends to portray law as mere collections of inter-
stitial or hard cases which have no right answers according to the legal
realist view, 50 and which exist in separate and distinct fields, such as con-
tracts, torts, and property. Third, economists can claim that legal analysis
appears to satisfy a purely critical function - lawyers seem to think that
asking questions is sufficient.51 Because legal analysis offers no inherent
method for suggesting solutions to problems, solutions suggested by lawyers
are ad hoc in character. Since economic analysis does have an internally
consistent method for generating solutions to problems, economists are fond
of saying that economics, no matter how much criticized, is "the only game
in town."'5 2
With respect to the charge of superficiality, the criticisms of both profes-
sions have some merit. A non-superficial synthesis of law and economics is
one that combines the rigorous analysis and generality of economics with the
highly fact-specific, hard-case approach of law; a synthesis combines the
economists' concern for efficiency with lawyers' concern for distributional
equity. In such an approach, the effectiveness of an economic theory, stated
in terms of the general case, will be tested by its ability to provide an inter-
44. P. PHILLIPS, MARX AND ENGELS ON LAW AND LAWS (1980).
45. L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986).
46. MINDA, The Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies Movements in American
Law, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1989). Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical
Legal Scholar" The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 199
(1984).
47. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOuRSEs ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
48. "[T]he word carries with it a certain absence or indeterminacy of meaning. Literary
language foregrounds language itself as something not reducible to meaning: it opens as well
as closes the disparity between symbol and idea, between written, sig and assigned meaning."
Geoffrey Hartman, Preface, in Harold Bloom, DECONSTRUCTION & CRITICISM vii-viii (1979).
See R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at ch. 6.
49. Economists often quip that the wedding of economics to mathematics has introduced
so much rigor into economics that it now has rigormortis.
50. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 36-37, 161-62 (1986). Dworkin, of course, believes that
hard cases do have right answers. R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at ch. 5. See supra note 23.
This author finds his view persuasive.
51. This author is acquainted with a law professor, who shall remain nameless, who takes
great pride in stating that while teaching, he only asks questions and never gives answers. In
fairness to this professor, it must be said also that he is a master of the Socratic teaching
technique.
52. Nobel Laureate Lawrence Klein made this statement in an econometrics course he
taught as a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Center of The City University of New York,
Spring, 1982. Professor Klein made this statement in response to a student's criticism that
econometric models were not useful because they usually failed to predict accurately the turn-
ing points of business cycles. By this statement, he meant that econometric models may be far
from perfect, but they are the only available technique with which to engage in economic
forecasting.
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pretation of hard common law cases that both lawyers and economists
would recognize as resulting in a good fit.
Economists attempt to make general economic theory5 3 fit specific cases
53. The fundamental tool of general economic theory is the theory of supply and demand
which is constructed from fundamental assumptions about the behavior of individuals and
production technology. First, the theoretical derivation of demand is based upon three funda-
mental behavioral assumptions: 1) Individuals or firms prefer more of anything to less; 2)
Given any two bundles of "goods" such as two oranges or three apples, an individual is able to
compare and rank them to determine whether he or she is indifferent to them or prefers one
over the other; 3) Individual preferences are transitive. For instance if an individual prefers
bundle X to bundle Y, and bundle Y to bundle Z, then the individual must prefer bundle X to
bundle Z. Given these three behavioral assumptions about individual preferences plus a
budget constraint, which limits the amount of money an individual or firm can spend, it is
possible to derive the law of downward sloping demand. If an individual's income remains
constant and if the prices of all goods remain constant, except one which varies, almost invari-
ably an inverse relationship will exist between the price of that good and the quantity de-
manded. H. VARIAN, supra note 31, at chs. 2-6; E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at chs. 3-5 (6th
ed. 1988).
The theoretical derivation of supply curves is based upon the following laws and assump-
tions: The law of scarcity holds that resources or factors of production, land, labor, capital
and entrepreneurial ability, which people use to produce goods and services, are scarce because
society does not have enough resources to fulfill its seemingly endless wants. Given existing
technology and the limited resources at any firms disposal, the more of any one good the firm
produces the less of another it will be able to produce. In other words, the opportunity cost of
any good or decision is the forgone good or value of the next best alternative. The principle of
increasing costs holds that as the production of a good expands, the opportunity cost to pro-
duce another unit generally increases. This principle is not a universal fact (witness economies
of scale), but it does seem to be a technological regularity that applies to a wide range of
economic activities. The principle of increasing costs has two explanations: First resources
tend to be specialized, at least in part, so that they lose some of their productivity when trans-
ferred from doing what they are relatively good at doing to what they are relatively bad at
doing. For instance, machines that manufacture leather shoes are not easily transformed into
machines that produce synthetic athletic shoes. Second, the law of diminishing returns, states
that if one input into a production process remains fixed in amount and equal increments of a
variable input are added to the production process, the resulting increments of the product or
marginal output will eventually diminish. For instance, if one adds equal additional amounts
of labor to a farm of fixed size, at some point the extra output from an additional unit of labor
will decrease. Thus, expansion of output will causes costs to rise. The law of increasing costs
explains that in order to induce the supply of a greater quantity, one must increase price.
Thus, the quantity of a product supplied is usually positively related to price. W. BAUMOL &
A. BLINDER, supra note 30, at 34-56; P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMIcS supra






better by employing models,54 which are constructed by choosing assump-
tions with relevance limited to specific sets of facts."s Just as models are
more specific than general theory, paradigms are still more specific than
models.5 6 Paradigms literally are examples composed of stylized facts, the
underlying assumptions of which are implicit rather than explicit. A com-
modity or stock exchange, which is one paradigm of the competitive model,
will be discussed below. In sum, general economic theory is made more
specific by the use of models, which in turn are made still more specific by
the use of economic paradigms. In reverse perspective, paradigms are em-
bedded in models which are in turn embedded in general theory.57 The styl-
ized fact patterns used in economic paradigms are very much like the
stylized fact patterns employed in legal analysis in general 8 and legal hy-
potheticals in particular. Legal hypotheticals, however, are much more ad
hoc in character than economic paradigms because the logical structures un-
derlying legal hypotheticals are usually implicit, at best, and because the
behavior assumed in legal hypotheticals is often idiosyncratic and may be
inconsistent with more general behavioral assumptions. 59
For ease and clarity of exposition, this Article will use economic para-
digms in the text, and relegate models, theory, and explicit assumptions that
underlie these paradigms to footnotes as much as possible. The synthesis of
law and economics presented in this Article combines the generality of an
economic paradigm with the specificity of hard common law cases to form
the hard common law case paradigm, or in short, the hard case paradigm.
Section Three contains an extended analysis of a representative hard com-
mon law case, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.60 Hard common law cases
consist of those cases in which issues of distributional equity and efficiency
are interrelated and difficult to disentangle. Then, the question is asked,
In principle, a free market allows the forces of supply and demand to select an equilibrium
price, PE, and an equilibrium quantity, QE, toward which, in practice, actual price and actual
quantity may gravitate. At that price and quantity, the amount buyers wish to buy is equal to
the amount that sellers wish to sell. W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 30, at 56-58. P.
SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 39, at 62-63.
54. For instance, economic models include competition oligopoly, monopoly, etc.
55. See supra note 53 for brief description of general economic theory and the assump-
tions which support it. See infra note 189 for four additional assumptions necessary to gener-
ate the competitive model and the model itself; see infra note 198 for the monopoly and
bilateral monopoly models and their assumptions.
56. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 174-76, 187-91 (2d ed.
1970).
57. For example, Section 3A. 1 states a commodity or stock exchange paradigm of a com-
petitive market. See infra note 189 for a discussion of the paradigm embedded in the competi-
tive model and note 55 for an analysis of the competitive model embedded in general economic
theory.
58. What are the facts? ... And is it not clear further when you pick up the
facts... which do seem relevant, you suddenly cease to deal with them in the
concrete and deal with them instead in categories which you, for one reason or
another, deem significant? It is not a particular pale magenta Buick eight, by
number 732507, but 'a motor car', and perhaps even 'a vehicle'.
K. N. LLEWELLYN, supra note 8, at 47-48.
59. See Section 2C for a discussion on the distinction between legal hypotheticals and
economic paradigms in the context of an analysis of a particular legal hypothetical.
60. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
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which of two competing economic paradigms, competition or bilateral mo-
nopoly, gives an interpretation that best fits such cases. Section Three will
show that bilateral monopoly provides an interpretation that fits hard com-
mon law cases better than competition. In order for the competitive model
to fit the facts, each party to a potential transaction must have myriad alter-
native opportunities to transact with others, so that neither party has eco-
nomic power over the other, nor can take advantage of the other. Such a
model does not fit the facts of a lawsuit in which two parties must deal with
each other and cannot prevent each other from seeking unfair advantage by
threatening to deal with others. The bilateral monopoly model, in which
two parties must deal with each other, best fits the facts of hard common law
cases. The bilateral monopoly model demonstrates that in hard common
law cases, courts have some, but not complete, freedom to alter distribu-
tional consequences without impairing efficiency. 61
This Article will also show that the bilateral monopoly interpretation fits
the facts and conclusions of law in hard common law cases like Boomer
better than does the Coase Theorem interpretation. Moreover, the analysis
of this Article is supported by both Baumol's demonstration that the Coase
Theorem's extreme assertion that courts are free to alter distributive conse-
quences of economic activity without impairing efficiency is generally incor-
rect, 62 as well as Cooter's demonstration that "the central version of the
Coase Theorem cannot be deduced from economic assumptions. ' 63
II. TAKING WEALTH MAXIMIZATION SERIOUSLY6 4
This section begins with a discussion of the Pareto criterion of efficiency,
which economists use to evaluate whether and how well consumers' interests
are served by markets having different structures such as competition, oli-
gopoly, and monopoly, or restrictions including price controls, subsidies,
and taxes. The Pareto criterion of efficiency allows economists to demon-
strate that voluntary transactions by individuals acting in free, competitive
markets best serve consumers' interests.
Pareto efficiency relies entirely on voluntary transactions and cannot be
used to evaluate non-market, government action requiring involuntary trans-
fers. The Kaldor-Hicks 65 criterion of efficiency employs hypothetical trans-
actions to determine when involuntary transfers are justified. In the well
61. See the discussion in Sections 2B-2D. "The problem of bilateral monopoly created by
injunctive remedies is not limited to specific performance in contract cases... For example, in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., the plaintiffs were seeking an injunction against pollution from
defendant's plant." (footnote omitted). R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 119. Although Posner
states that Boomer involves a bilateral monopoly problem, and indeed makes frequent mention
of the bilateral monopoly problem in his book, he does not explain the concept and avoids any
discussion of how issues of distributional equity and efficiency are interrelated and difficult to
disentangle in bilateral monopoly.
62. Baumol, supra note 36, at 312.
63. Cooter, supra note 35, at 1, 15. See infra notes 229-49 and accompanying text.
64. This section title paraphrases the title of a book I greatly admire. R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
65. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
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known book, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Judge Richard Posner popu-
larized the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency under the name of wealth
maximization. 66
Taking the goal of wealth maximization seriously, however, one cannot
equate any criterion of efficiency to wealth maximization because the total
amount of wealth a society generates depends upon both the efficiency and
the distribution of income. Once the functional relationship between social
wealth, efficiency, and distributional equity is correctly specified, a resolu-
tion of the value conflict between lawyers and economists, concerning the
criterion that should be used to evaluate governmental coercion of a
predominantly economic character, is easily affected. When the social
wealth function is correctly specified, wealth maximization results in a solu-
tion that is both efficient and has a strong claim to distributional equity.
A. The Pareto Criterion of Efficiency 67
The paradigm of the competitive market process that will be used to ex-
plain the Pareto criterion of efficiency is: a single bilateral transaction en-
tered into voluntarily, for instance when one buys a loaf of bread.68 Thus,
each party is better off as a result of the transaction or a voluntary transac-
tion would not have taken place; both the baker and the buyer must gain
from the trade. A single, voluntary transaction is the basis of the criterion of
Pareto superiority, which is used to determine when a change from one state
to another is an improvement. Stated as a principle, "change which harms
no one and which makes some people better off (in their own estimation)
must be considered an improvement." 69
The paradigmatic transaction is just one of the many billions of Pareto
superior transactions occurring in a market economy. If all markets are
competitive, no party to any one of these billions of Pareto superior transac-
tions can get a better deal than the deal he or she actually makes by rear-
ranging trading partners. What limits the number of Pareto superior
transactions that can occur in a competitive economy? The maximum
number of Pareto superior transactions is achieved at a state when it is im-
possible to find two additional parties who are willing and able70 to make
another voluntary transaction. No additional transaction can occur in this
state because the only individuals who want to make an additional transac-
tion are either potential sellers, wanting to sell at a price which exceeds the
price at which potential buyers are willing to pay, or potential buyers, want-
66. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 13, 15. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-76,
88-115 (1981).
67. An Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto, first formulated the modem economist's
central evaluative concept.
68. See infra note 189 for the competitive model and its underlying assumptions.
69. W. BAUMOL, EONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 527 (4th ed. 1977).
Assuming, of course, that the subject of the transaction is legal and involves no market fail-
ures such as externalities, public goods, indivisibilities, or instabilities.




ing to buy at a price which is less than the price at which potential sellers are
willing to sell. If an additional transaction is made, the buyer or seller actu-
ally would be worse off in his or her estimation. In other words, supply and
demand is in equilibrium in all competitive markets.71 Stated as a principle,
a Pareto efficient state is one in which it is impossible to make a change
without making at least one person worse off.72
If supply and demand are in equilibrium in all competitive markets, then
one can conclude that individuals have exhausted all possible gains from
trade. Known as the First Theorem of Welfare Economics, 73 this conclusion
says nothing about the distribution of economic benefits. The market equi-
librium might not be a "just" allocation; if a person initially owned every-
thing, then that person would own everything even after trade. Although
efficient, it probably would not be very fair.74 The First Theorem says that
"any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient."' 75 This theorem and its
implications are not controversial. The Second Theorem of Welfare Eco-
nomics, 76 discussed below, implies that it is theoretically possible to separate
71. Consider the figure below: At any amount of output less than the competitive quan-
tity, QE or QF, someone exists who is willing to supply an extra unit of the good at price, Ps,
which is less than the price that someone is willing to pay for an extra unit of the good, PD. If
the good were produced and exchanged between these two people, for any price between the
demand price and supply price, both would benefit economically. Thus, an amount less than
the equilibrium amount cannot be Pareto efficient, since at least two people will exist who





Ps ........ S D
Q1 QE Quantity
COMPETITVE INDUSTRY
Similarly, at any output larger than QE, the amount someone would be willing to pay for an
extra unit of the good is less than the price that it would take to get it supplied. Only at the
market equilibrium Qa would a Pareto efficient amount of output occur, because at that
amount, the willingness of buyers to pay for an extra unit is equal to the willingness of sellers
to supply an extra unit. Thus, the competitive market produces a Pareto efficient amount of
output. H. VARIAN, supra note 31, at 306.
72. B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW xii (1975).
73. "The First Welfare Theorem guarantees that a competitive market will exhaust all of
the gains from trade: an equilibrium allocation achieved by a set of competitive markets will
necessarily be Pareto efficient .. " H. VARIAN, supra note 31, at 495 (1987).
74. Id. at 496.
75. Id. at 500. "There are hardly any explicit assumptions in this theorem-it follows
almost entirely from the definitions." Id.
76. See infra notes 90-109 and accompanying text.
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questions of distributional equity from efficiency; application of this The-
orum has led economists to ignore the distributional impact of their theories.
B. The Pareto Criterion of Efficiency Which Does Not Permit Involuntary
Transfers Unduly Restricts Government Action
Consider the following legal hypothetical 77 constructed by Ackerman in
order to demonstrate the restrictive character of the Pareto criterion as a test
to evaluate government action:78 Assume that the government of a two-
person society must determine how to distribute the single source of suste-
nance, manna. Under Policy A, one citizen, Glutton, will receive 100 grains
of manna and the other citizen, Starvation, will receive none. Under Policy
B, however, both Glutton and Starvation will each receive 99 grains of
manna because Policy B uses social resources more productively.
Given the restrictive definition of Pareto superiority, one cannot say that
Policy B is preferable to Policy A. Even though Policy B would greatly
improve Starvation's position, Glutton's position would slightly deteriorate.
Since a Pareto superior change is one that harms no one and makes some
people better off in their own estimation, Policy B would only be Pareto
superior to Policy A if Policy B permitted Glutton to retain 100 grains while
giving manna to Starvation. Moreover, assuming that the government must
choose between Policies A and B, whichever policy the government adopts
first would be Pareto efficient or optimal; if the government adopts Policy A,
it is not possible to change to Policy B without harming Glutton. The same
problem exists if the government initially adopts Policy B. Thus, the Pareto
criterion is a very restrictive criterion to evaluate government activity be-
cause it does not allow interpersonal utility comparisons. One cannot tax a
gluttonous rich person even one dollar for the benefit of a starving poor
person.
This hypothetical example deliberately emphasizes the restrictive charac-
ter of Pareto criterion as a guide to government policy. This example, how-
ever, is somewhat misleading because it makes the Pareto criterion appear
unduly restrictive and trivial. As the hypothetical example shows, the
Pareto criterion is not normally used to evaluate government policy changes
that are global in character, but is best suited to evaluate which of the mil-
lions of possible marginal changes are preferrable in a competitive market
economy. Moreover, the enduring appeal of the Pareto criterion is due to its
strong moral foundation - it forbids coercion of any kind and does not
allow any interpersonal comparisons or evaluations. It is hard to think of a
reason to reject a rule which makes some people better off and no one worse
off. Thus, economic analysis indicating that one policy is Pareto superior to
another, provides a very strong argument for adopting that policy over its
77. Although in practice it is often difficult whether to classify an example as an economic
paradigm or a legal hypothetical, this example is classified as a legal hypothetical because it
has no implicit support from an underlying theory of production or government action.
78. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 72, at xi-xii.
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"Pareto inferior" alternative.7 9
C. The Kaldor-Hicks Criterion of Efficiency Justifies
Involuntary Transfers8°
By definition, the Pareto criterion of efficiency requires entirely voluntary
transactions. The criterion, therefore, cannot be used to justify any govern-
mental action that requires involuntary transfers. The Kaldor-Hicks crite-
rion of efficiency justifies governmental action that mandates involuntary
transfers because it allows government to make interpersonal utility compar-
isons,8' for instance, taxation of one person for another person's benefit. The
Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency is therefore a less restrictive guide on
which to base governmental action, than is the Pareto criterion of efficiency.
Consider the following hypothetical constructed by Polinsky82 to explain
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion: suppose the government must decide whether to
build a dam. The Dean and a professor at Stanford Law School are the only
two individuals affected by this governmental decision. Without the dam,
the Dean's income is $65 and the professor's income is $35, so that their
total income is $100. The dam would cost $30 to build, consisting of $30
worth of the professor's labor but none of the Dean's. The dam would create
benefits worth $40, which would go only to the Dean because the location
for building the dam happens to be on his property. If the dam is built, the
Dean would have $105 and the professor would have $5, so their total in-
come would be $110. According to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency,
the government should build the dam because it creates benefits worth $40
to the Dean and costs of only $30 to the professor resulting in a net social
gain of $10.83 As a principle, "the Kaldor-Hicks criterion states that a
change is an improvement if those who gain evaluate their gains at a higher
figure than the value which the losers set upon their losses."
84
Applying the Pareto criterion of efficiency in this hypothetical example,
the dam would not be built unless the professor agreed voluntarily to build
the dam with his labor. The professor may not be willing to provide his
labor at any price. If this is the case, the dam should not be built according
to the Pareto criterion. If the professor demanded more than $40 to build
the dam, the parties could not reach an agreement because such agreement
would result in a social loss; the cost of building the dam would be greater
than the total benefit from the dam. If an actual agreement is made, the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion is superfluous. Unlike the Pareto criterion, however,
which requires that an actual transaction take place, the Kaldor-Hicks crite-
rion requires only that such transactions be hypothetically possible. Hypo-
thetically, the Dean could fully compensate the professor for his $30 loss and
79. Id. at xii.
80. J.R. Hicks and Nickolas Kaldor were British economists who made seminal
contributions to the theory of welfare economics.
81. W. BAUMOL, supra note 69, at 530.
82. A. POLINSKY, supra note 3, at 8-9.
83. Id. at 8.
84. W. BAUMOL, supra note 69, at 529.
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still have a gain of $10 to divide between them. The net gain of $10 could be
distributed between the Dean and the professor in a number of ways, all to
the Dean, all to the professor, $5 to each, or $3 to the Dean and $7 to the
professor. Again, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not require such compen-
sation, it only requires that it be hypothetically possible. "The Kaldor-Hicks
concept is also and suggestively called potential Pareto superiority. ' 5
In the dam hypothetical, Polinsky points out that the distributional impli-
cations of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion may strike many as unfair 8 6 Polinsky
notes the conflict between efficiency and equity: building the dam is more
efficient but less equitable than not building the dam.8 7 "If promoting equity
is very important, it might be desirable to sacrifice some efficiency for more
equity by not building the dam (in other words, 'damn' the Dean)."88
Although Polinsky asks whether the government should adopt the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion and build the dam in view of the conflict between
efficiency and distributional equity, Polinsky does not ask whether the gov-
ernment could force the professor to comply with its directive to build the
dam if it adopted the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. In other words, would the
professor comply and supply his labor or would he head off to Berkeley or
points east or southwest? This question illuminates one of the main differ-
ences between an economic paradigm and a legal hypothetical. Economic
paradigms are supported by a rich context of models, theory and behavioral
assumptions. Legal hypotheticals, on the other hand, are ad hoc in charac-
ter and usually lack such supporting logical structure and may contain idio-
syncratic behavioral assumptions often inconsistent with the norm. If the
government adopted the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and decreed that the dam
be built, would the professor comply with this government directive which
not only exacerbates the existing income inequality between the Dean and
himself, but which also confiscates the professor's labor? The behavioral as-
sumptions underlying this legal hypothetical are far from clear.
Economists often emphasize that the government's tax and expenditure
policy, which attempts to reduce income inequality by transfers of income
from rich to poor, runs grave risks of creating severe negative effects on the
incentive to work. The taxes affect both those who are taxed and those who
receive the transferred income.89 Economists are not, however, so zealous in
pointing out that governmental policy which increases income inequality
85. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 13. In terms of the Calabresian categories of entitle-
ments, property rights and liability rules at infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text, using
the Pareto criterion is equivalent to giving the Professor an entitlement to his labor protected
by a property right. Alternatively, if the government actually rather than hypothetically re-
quired the Dean to compensate the Professor for his $30 loss and share the net gain between $0
and $10, that would be equivalent to giving the Professor an entitlement to his labor protected
by a liability rule. In the context of this hypothetical example, the Kaldor-Hicks rule is gov-
ernment confiscation of the Professor's labor.
86. A. POLINSKY, supra note 3, at 8-9.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. A. OKUN, supra note 38, at 96-98; P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 39, at
809-13; Calabresi, supra note 42.
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may also have severe disincentive effects on effort. The dam hypothetical is
a case in point. The next subsection addresses whether governmental action,
or inaction, that exacerbates income inequality actually reduces total social
wealth as much as some governmental action which attempts to eliminate
income inequality. In other words, the next subsection considers the ques-
tion of how distributional equity, efficiency, and social wealth relate to each
other.
D. Social Wealth Depends Upon and Is A Function Of Both
Distributional Equity And Efficiency
If one takes the goal of wealth maximization seriously, at least two rea-
sons exist why one cannot equate efficiency to wealth maximization. First,
an efficient economy is not necessarily a full employment economy in the
sense of maximum possible resource use. Second, and more important, the
total social wealth a society generates depends upon distributional equity as
well as upon efficiency.
Early in the study of elementary economics one learns that an "efficient"
economy is usually identified as an economy fully employing its resources. 90
These elementary discussions, however, never explicitly explain that full em-
ployment in terms of efficiency criteria has no necessary relation to maxi-
mum possible use of resources. A "fully employed" economy when
evaluated according to the Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks criteria of efficiency may
be far from fully employed in the sense of maximum possible use of re-
sources. For example, if everyone in a competitive economy voluntarily
chooses to work 20 hours per week instead of 40 or 60 hours per week, each
person foregoes the opportunity to earn additional wages because he or she
values the gain of an additional hour of leisure more than the loss of fore-
gone income from an additional hour of work. Even though such an econ-
omy is not making maximum possible use of its resources, it is both efficient
and fully employed when evaluated by Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks criteria.
Over the last century in the United States, the average work week has
declined from over 55 hours per week to less than 40 hours per week. 91
Recall that in 1905, the Supreme Court held in Lochner that a New York
law prohibiting bakery employees from working more than 60 hours per
week violated the United States Constitution. 92 On the other hand, during
the last twenty-five years, the labor force participation rate of women has
increased dramatically. 93 Clearly, satisfaction of an efficiency criterion is not
90. Full employment and efficiency are usually discussed in the context of the production
possibility curve in order to illustrate the law of scarcity and opportunity cost. P. SAMUELSON
& W. NORDHAUS, supra note 39, at 25-35. W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 30, at 37-
43.
91. I. RIMA, LABOR MARKETS, WAGES, AND EMPLOYMENT 53 (1981). "Between 1900
and 1940, the full-time work week declined approximately 35 percent." Id. at 52.
92. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
93. "The single most important development in the labor market since World War II has
been the growth in the percentage of adult women who are working or seeking work." D.
HAMERMESH & A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY 11 (3d ed. 1984).
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sufficient to guarantee that a society's wealth will be maximized in any abso-
lute sense. Thus, the first caveat with respect to the goal of social wealth
maximization is that the maximum amount of wealth a society can produce
has an elastic upper limit, dependant upon, among other things, how indi-
viduals in society value additional leisure against additional income and
wealth. In other words, Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency may be a neces-
sary condition of wealth maximization, but it is not a sufficient condition.
As indicated, the First Theorem of Welfare Economics states that regard-
less of income distribution, a competitive equilibrium will result in a Pareto
efficient allocation of resources.94 What about the other way around? The
Second Theorem of Welfare Economics says that given a Pareto efficient
allocation of resources, in principle it is possible to find a competitive equi-
librium for some appropriate initial premarket income distribution.9"
Although the First Theorem and its implications are not controversial, the
Second Theorem, implying that the problems of distributional equity and
efficiency can in principle be separated, 96 has led economists to unwisely
ignore the distributional impact of their theories. On the basis of the Second
Theorem, economists argue that distribution and efficiency can theoretically
be separated. These economists argue that it is possible, in principle, to tax
individuals so as to avoid changing their behavior with respect to how hard
and how long they work.97 Revenue derived from so-called lump sum taxes,
which have no disincentive effect on labor because the taxes are independent
of how hard a person actually works, could theoretically be transferred to
other individuals so that the government could achieve any desired income
distribution.9" The net result would be an efficient economy in which indi-
viduals are working as hard as before such taxes and transfers. To be sure,
the competitive markets after taxes and transfers would probably produce
different goods for different individuals than the competitive markets before
such taxes and transfers. On balance, however, everyone would be working
as hard as before. "[T]he message of the Second Welfare Theorem is impor-
tant. Prices should be used to reflect scarcity. Lump sum transfers of
wealth should be used to adjust for distributional goals. To a large degree,
these two policy decisions can be separated." 99 Thus, economists justify the
94. A society that organizes its activity through competitive markets is efficient even if it
has a highly unequal distribution of income. H. VARIAN, supra note 31, at 496.
95. Id. at 498-500.
96. The Second Welfare Theorem implies that the problems of distribution and efficiency
can be separated. Id. at 503.
97. Id. at 502-03.
98. We could imagine a mechanism for levying this kind of tax. Suppose that we
considered a society where each consumer was required to give the money
earned in 10 hours of his labor time to the state each week. This kind of tax
would be independent of how much the person actually worked-it would only
depend on the endowment of labor, not on how much was actually sold. Such a
tax is basically transferring some part of each consumer's endowment of labor
time to the state. The state could then use these funds to provide various goods,
or it could simply transfer these funds to other agents.
Id. at 503.
99. Id. at 503.
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lack of attention to distributional equity by concentrating on the efficiency of
competitive markets in the belief that legislators will establish distributional
equity through lump-sum taxes and transfers.
In practice, distributional equity and efficiency cannot be separated for
three reasons. First, unlike theoretical lump-sum taxes, substantial real
world taxes, such as income, sales, and property taxes, do have significant
potential impact on work incentives.l°0 Second, if one considers statements
by economists, that a trade-off exists between distribution and efficiency, as
legitimate, 10 1 then in practice, economists do not believe that issues of distri-
bution and efficiency are separable. Third, as shown above, nothing is sacred
about the current level, or any given level, of work effort and resource use;
these levels are the product of a society's wealth, culture and government
policy.
Since all economists acknowledge that real-world government taxes and
transfers that significantly alter the distribution of income do significantly
affect work incentives, it is necessary to consider such effects. The First The-
orem of Welfare Economics says that each and every premarket distribution
of income can result in a different efficient economy. 10 2 Thus, an infinite
number of possible efficient economies exist, each of which is functionally
derived from a different distribution of income. 10 3 It is highly improbable,
with a probability arbitrarily close to zero, that these infinite number of pos-
sible efficient economies all generate the same work effort, Gross National
Product (GNP), income, and social wealth.
Consider three examples. In case E (E for equality), assume that govern-
ment taxes and transfers are used to redistribute income, resulting in com-
plete income equality before the individuals commit resources to any
particular production route. For instance, every family is given the same
pre-market income regardless of whether and how much they work. There
is no despute amoung economists that such pre-market income equality
would have serious negative effects on incentives to work; many individuals
would opt for leisure rather than work if their income was guaranteed to be
equal to every one else's income. An economy with low GNP, income, and
wealth would result. Nevertheless, such an economy, if competitive, would
be efficient according to the First Theorem.
In Case I (I for inequality), an income distribution of great inequality
would result in a competitive economy that has low GNP, income, and so-
cial wealth. Society would lack skilled individuals due to loss of opportunity
for self-improvement. Economists call investment in education and training
100. "It would appear, then, that assuming the government can pursue an optimal lump-
sum redistribution policy is heroic in the extreme." R. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMA-
TIVE THEORY 45 (1981). See R. MUSORAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1984).
101. A. OKUN, supra note 38, at 51. P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 39, at
809-13; Calabresi, supra note 42, at 553 n.l; R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 267-68.
102. See supra note 94.
103. Mathematically, E = f(D). Efficiency is the dependent variable in a function in which
distribution, D, is the independent variable.
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human capital. 104 The economy, however, would be efficient according to
the First Theorem. Moreover, as the income distribution becomes more un-
equal, crime, a negative externality, 10 5 may rise and cause a further reduc-
tion in an economy's income, GNP, and social wealth. Finally, there must
exist a Case M (M for maximum wealth) somewhere in between Case E
(complete income equality) and Case I (extreme income inequality) such
that the work effort and social wealth generated by that income distrubution
are greater than either extreme case or any other case in between those ex-
treme cases. Therefore, depending upon the assumed income distribution,
some efficient economies must generate more work effort, GNP, income, and
social wealth than others.
The mathematical statement which expresses the cause and effect relation-
ship between social wealth, distribution, and efficiency is W = f(D,E). This
equation represents two independent variables, distribution (D) and effi-
ciency (E), which act through some unspecified functional process (f), and
thereby determines the value of the dependent variable, social wealth (W).
In short, this mathematical equation constitutes nothing more than a state-
ment that wealth depends upon both income distribution and efficiency, not
just efficiency alone. 1°6 Those who argue that efficiency is the only signifi-
cant determinant of social wealth are guilty of what econometricians 10 7 call
a specification error. A specification error occurs when one omits from con-
sideration relevant variables, called material variables by lawyers.108 Prop-
erly specified variables that materially determine social wealth include both
distribution and efficiency. The social wealth function, which contains three
variables (points W, D, and E) can be represented graphically.109
104. W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 30, at 801-02.
105. See the discussion of the economic theory of crime in Section 2E. See infra note 234
for discussion of externalities.
106. Although the function W = f(D,E) is probably multi-valued for any given Gini coeffi-
cient (defined in footnote 109) used as the value of D in the social wealth function, for instance
a given D may map into more than one level of total social wealth, a continuous set presuma-
bly bounds the social wealth function because some maximum W exists for any given D. Case
M, where the function of total social wealth is maximized, follows from Rolle's Theorem of
calculus. "If f is a continuous function in the closed interval [a,b] and if f(a) = f(b), then f has
at least one critical number in the open interval (a,b)." R. JOHNSON & F. KIOKEMEISTER,
CALCULUS WITH ANALYTIC GEOMETRY 122 (2d ed. 1960).
107. [E]conometrics is the branch of economics concerned with the empirical esti-
mation of economic relationships. The "metric" part of the word signifies mea-
surement; and econometrics is basically concerned with measuring economic
relationships. Econometrics utilizes economic theory, as embodied in an
econometric model; facts, as summarized by relevant data; and statistical the-
ory, as refined into econometric techniques, in order to measure and to test em-
pirically certain relationships among economic variables, thereby giving
empirical content to economic reasoning.
M. INTRILIGATOR, ECONOMETRIC MODELS, TECHNIQUES, & APPLICATIONS 2 (1978) (em-
phasis omitted).
108. "There are several types of possible errors in specifying the model. Among them are
the exclusion of relevant variables, the inclusion of irrelevant variables, an incorrect form of
the relationship (e.g., treating a nonlinear model as if it were linear), and an incorrect specifica-
tion of the stochastic disturbance [error] form.. ." Id. at 187.
109. As demonstrated in Figure a, below, it is possible to simplify the three-dimensional
graph by viewing a cross section (the end slice in bold outline) from Figure a. The cross
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E. The Recipe for Wealth Maximization
Economists often make disingenuous statements to the effect that a
section's two variables, social wealth and income distribution (points W and D) can be



















Wealth is a function of distribution and efficiency W = f(D,E). Additionally, the First
Theorem of Welfare Economics implies that a function relates efficiency and distribution for
every distribution of income. E = g(D) where g is used instead of f in order to indicate that
the function for E and the previous function for W are different. Therefore, since wealth is a
function of both distribution and efficiency, and since efficiency is a function of distribution, a
function relates social wealth and distribution W = h(D). Since W = f(D,E) and E = g(D), if
one substitutes g(D) in place of E in the function for W, one gets W = j(D,g{Dj) or W -
h(D).
Although efficiency does not appear directly in Figure b, which relates income distribution
to total social wealth, every economy depicted satisfies Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks criteria because















"trade-off" exists between distribution and efficiency.' 10 As demonstrated
previously, such statements are disingenuous in two senses."1' The same
economists who justify ignoring the distributional implications of their theo-
ries because the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics implies that in prin-
ciple distributional equity and efficiency are separable and independent of
each other, also maintain that legislative action invariably results in a trade-
off between distribution and efficiency in practice. In actuality, the econo-
mist is usually alleging a trade-off between the degree of income inequality
Figure b depicts the relationship between the degree of income inequality and social wealth.
Total social wealth is measured on the vertical axis. Income inequality is measured on the
horizontal axis. Economists usually measure income equality on a Lorenz curve. A Lorenz
curve represents a particular income distribution at a particular time. In the figure below, the
cumulative percentage of total population is ranked from poorest to richest on the horizontal
axis. The vertical axis measures the cumulative percentage of total income earned by any
given percentage of the poorest people. The diagonal line represents perfect equality; for ex-
ample, at point d, the poorest 40% of families have 40% of the income. On the Lorenz curve









33 .... ...-.-.----- B
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As the Lorenz bows away from the diagonal line, the distribution of income becomes more
unequal. P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 39, at 644-48; W. BAUMOL & A.
BLINDER, supra note 30, at 828-29.
The Gini coefficient of inequality makes it possible to rank all income distributions on a
scale from 0 to 1. The Gini coefficient is found by determining the area between the line of
equality and the Lorenz curve, labeled A in the Figure above, and dividing that area by the
area of the triangle formed by the diagonal line and the bottom-right half of the rectangle,
(A-+B). Thus, the Gini coefficient = A/(A+ B). In the case of income equality, the Lorenz
curve is equal to the diagonal line so that area A = 0 and the Gini coefficient is 0/(0+ B) = 0.
If extreme income inequality exists, in the limiting case, one individual has all the income or
wealth, and thereby causes the Lorenz curve to coincide with the bottom and right sides of the
Lorenz figure so that B = 0 and the Gini coefficient is A/(A+0) = 1. R. MILLER, ECONOM-
IcS TODAY 448-49 (6th ed. 1988). LEBERGOTT, 7 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SO-
CIAL SCIENCES 152-53 (1968).
The next subsection discusses the shape of the function, which relates the degree of income
inequality and social wealth. The important social issues concern the shape of the curves in
Figures a and b, and how society can achieve point M of maximum social wealth on those
curves.
110. A. OKUN, supra note 38 at 88-95; P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 38, at
809-13.
111. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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and total social wealth.' 12
This thesis implausibly implies a strictly permanent inverse relationship
between the degree of income inequality and social wealth. 1,3 The trade-off
thesis implies that no matter how unequal the initial distribution of income,
any movement toward income equality will always reduce total social
wealth. Conversely, the thesis implies that no matter how unequal the initial
distribution of income, any movement toward greater income inequality will
always increase social wealth.1 1 4
Dworkin argues that it is a mistake to think of the relationship between
distribution and efficiency in terms of a trade-off in the sense of a "compro-
mise."'1 15 Dworkin considers distribution and efficiency as two ingredients
in a recipe which requires combining the two in the correct amounts, just as
a cake requires a proper mix of ingredients.1 16 Dworkin's recipe metaphor is
an appropriate way to describe the function which relates the degree of in-
come inequality, efficiency, and social wealth. The recipe which maximizes
social wealth is composed of the two ingredients, efficiency and a particular
degree of income inequality.' 1 7
As previously discussed, there is no dispute among economists that a gov-
ernment redistribution of income which guarantees complete income equal-
ity has serious negative effects on incentives to work and results in an
economy with low GNP, income, and wealth; 18 also, little dispute exists
among economists that an economy with a highly unequal distribution of
income would result in a low GNP, income, and wealth, because there
would be few skilled individuals due to society's lack of investment in human
112. "Calabresi speaks of a trade-off or mix of wealth and distribution." R. DWORKIN,
supra note 2, at 268, Calabresi, supra note 42, at 553 n. 1.
113. R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 268-69 (1985). See P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS,
supra note 39, at 812-15. In terms of Figure b at supra note 109, the trade-off thesis implies
that the curve must always have a positive slope. The curve must begin low near the left vertex
of the Figure and continually rise upward as it proceeds to the right.
114. See supra note 113. Considered most charitably, the thesis of a trade-off between
distribution and social wealth is correct only if, in the context of Figure b, the speaker is
referring to the positively sloped portion of the curve between E and M, on which a leftward
movement toward income equality does reduce social wealth.
115. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 269.
116. Id.
117. In order to maximize social wealth, an efficient economy is required as one ingredient.
What are the characteristics of the distributional ingredient? How equal or unequal should
income be in order to maximize social wealth? This question is answered by analyzing why the
curve in Figure b, supra note 109, relating the degree of income inequality to total social
wealth, has the shape depicted. As argued below, the curve must have a positively sloped
portion (from points E to M) on which a movement toward income equality must reduce social
wealth. The curve must also include a negatively sloped portion (from points I to M) on which
an increase in income inequality must reduce social wealth. Further, the point of maximum
social wealth, point M, is probably located somewhere to the left of the current Gini coefficient
for income in the United States. Finally, as a practical matter, it is not necessary to know the
exact shape of the curve or exactly where point M is located in order to evaluate specific
government policies.
118. This trade-off reasoning accounts for the positively sloped portion, EM, of the curve
in Figure b, supra note 109. The negatively sloped portion, MI, of the curve in Figure b has a
dual explanation. See infra text accompanying notes 119-20.
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capital through education and training.' 19 Second, as the distribution of in-
come gets progressively more unequal, it becomes more likely that the social
disorganization characteristic of some African-American and Hispanic ghet-
tos in the United States, would occur generally. 120 The economic theory of
crime suggests that such social disorganization would spread to the general
population if the income distribution were to become progressively more
unequal.
Economists assume that rational self-interested behavior explains most
criminal activity. 12 1 In the context of economic theory, a criminal is some-
one who has so few opportunities for gainful employment, whether due to
lack of training or skill, laziness, or deprived background, that this individ-
ual's highest income potential comes from crime. Criminals are individuals
whose opportunity costs in terms of income forgone from legitimate employ-
ment are very low. Individual self-interest causes such persons to engage in
crime. As long as relatively few criminals exists in society, the social fabric
will remain stable. At some point, however, as the distribution of income
becomes less equal, the percentage of the population finding a rational alter-
native in crime becomes significant. The social fabric, thus, will begin to
unravel.
One can analogize the increase in crime with the "tipping model" used to
explain "white flight" in housing integration. 122 Arguably, if only one or
several minority families move into an all-white neighborhood, white fami-
lies will not sell their homes and leave the neighborhood. As long as the
percentage of minority families in the neighborhood remains below a certain
figure, "white flight" will not occur. Beyond that percentage, "tipping" or
"white flight" occurs and nearly all white families leave the neighborhood.
In terms of this model, the percentage at which "tipping" occurs is a param-
eter that can be empirically estimated.
The "tipping" model is probably applicable to the relationship between
the degree of income inequality and social wealth. As income becomes pro-
gressively more unequal, a point will likely be reached where "tipping" oc-
curs in the sense that social disorganization becomes noticeable because a
significant percentage of the population will have an opportunity cost that is
low enough to make crime attractive. Certain American inner-city ghettos
and third world countries provide good examples of this phenomenon of
119. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (figures a and b).
120. See infra note 234. Recall that in note 106, the social wealth function, although mul-
tivalued, is assumably continuous and bounded. Thus, the possibility of externalities, which
make it less likely that the upper bound will be achieved, are not inconsistent with the social
wealth function as shown.
121. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 205-06. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
515-23 (1988). Sociologists greatly dispute the assumption that rational self-interested behav-
ior mostly explains criminal activity. Their criticism, however, is not my concern because the
argument here addresses distributional equity based on the economists' own methodology and
values.




social disorganization. 1 2 3 Thus, as inequality increases beyond the "tipping"
point, social wealth will likely decline rapidly due to this externality.
The preceding analysis has shown that the function which relates the de-
gree of income inequality to total social wealth has a maximum somewhere
between the two extremes of income equality and great income inequality,
and that this function must have both a positive and a negatively sloped
portion.124 What about its shape? Political conservatives may argue that
the point of maximum social wealth1 25 cannot be achieved without strong
work incentives and that only substantial income inequality can provide
such incentives. Thus, the curves in Figures a and b1 26 should be skewed to
the right. Political liberals may argue that the point of maximum social
wealth,1 27 cannot be achieved unless every individual has a reasonable op-
portunity to develop his or her talents, and that only substantial income
equality can provide such opportunity. Thus, the curves in Figures a and
b128 should be skewed to the left.
Physical traits such as strength, height or girth, and measured mental
traits such as intelligence, quotient or tone perception, appear to be not so
different among people as are the differences in the current income distribu-
tion. 129 Given that inequality of income is greater than inequality of ability,
this author believes that the current degree of inequality in the United States
123. There is no necessary inconsistency in the fact that crime rates are frequently
low in poor countries, even though inequality of wealth is often much greater in
those countries than in wealthier ones. If wealth is highly concentrated, the
costs of protecting it from criminals may be low. It is where wealth is more
widely distributed that criminals are presented with an abundance of attractive
targets.
R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 439 n.4.
124. See infra notes 110-23 and accompanying text.
125. See Point M, figures a & b, supra note 109.
126. See supra note 109 (figures a & b).
127. See Point M, figures a & b, supra note 109.
128. See supra note 109 (figures a & b).
129. P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 39, at 648.
SPREAD OF INCOME AND ABILITIES
Distribution ofAbilities amongDistribution of Individuals
Incomes among
Lowest Highest
Abilities are much more equally distributed than are incomes
"Human characteristics such as measured intelligence, height, weight, or strength are much
more equally distributed than are incomes. While human traits seldom differ by more than a




is more than enough to provide proper work incentives, but is too great to
provide the equality of opportunity1 30 necessary for the development of a
highly skilled labor force required by an efficient economy in the twenty-first
century. 1 31
Because competitive markets are efficient by definition, maximum social
wealth is likely to be achieved if government action establishes a "level play-
ing field" or rough equality of opportunity. Government policy should strive
for a pre-market income distribution, before resources are committed to any
particular production route, that guarantees all children will have the re-
sources with which to achieve reasonable minimum standards of education,
health and well being, so that as adults, all can effectively compete in mar-
kets. This government policy should also foster competition for government
subsidies to higher education and professional training which the market
forces do not adequately reflect as a social value.1 32 For example, encourage
individuals to obtain a Ph.D. in medieval literature. Governmental provi-
sion should also be available for the handicapped, the aged, and others not
able to compete in markets. In a society in which every individual has both
opportunity and proper incentives to develop his or her potential abilities,
social wealth likely will be maximized. It can be said of such a society, from
each according to his or her ability, to each according to his or her produc-
tivity, with consumer's surplus for all. 133
As a practical matter, one need not know the exact shape of the social
130. See M. HARRINGTON, THE NEW AMERICAN POVERTY 230-31 (1984).
131. R. MILLER, ECONOMICS TODAY 449 (6th ed. 1988). The point of maximum social
wealth, point M, is located to the left of the Gini coefficient for income in the United States
which was .369 in 1981.
132. Even conservative economists recognize that "[p]ublic expenditures on higher school-
ing can be justified as a means of training youngsters for citizenship and for community leader-
ship-though I hasten to add that the large fraction of current expenditure that goes for
strictly vocational training cannot be justified in this way, or indeed.... in any other." M.
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 99 (1962).
133. The productivity principle that an individual is entitled to what he creates can be
contrasted with Rawls' difference principle that income inequality is justified only to the extent
that it benefits the least advantaged. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes On Rawls's
Theory of Justice, LXX J. OF PHIL. 245, 248 (1973) (Arrow had difficulty in persuading stu-
dents that the productivity principle is not completely self-evident); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 75-80 (1971). The difference principle regards the talents and abilities of every indi-
vidual as belonging to a common pool shared equally by all. R. PAUL WOLFF, UNDERSTAND-
ING RAWLS 62 (1977).
Dworkin, who like Rawls leans more toward the equality principle than the productivity
principle, defends a conception called equality of resources. "Equality of resources recognizes,
however, that differences in talent are differences in resources, and for that reason it seeks in
some way to compensate the less talented beyond what the market awards them." R. DWOR-
KIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 297-98 (1986).
The productivity principle and the equality principle are not as antithetical as they appear to
be. The concept of consumer's surplus explains how markets which pay individuals according
to their productivity also benefit the common good. In the Figure below, the supply and de-
mand curves of a competitive industry are depicted.
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wealth curve 134 or exactly where its maximum 135 is located in order to eval-
uate specific government policies. It is only necessary to ask whether any
governmental action probably increases or decreases income equality, and
increases or decreases individual potential, incentive, and social wealth. As
examples, subsidized prenatal programs for the poor 136 and the Head Start
program, 137 which attempt to enrich the lives of disadvantaged children so
that they will be more likely to realize their potential, both probably increase
equality and social wealth. On the other hand, with respect to transfers of
income to adults, the United States is in the anomalous position in which
mothers who work get no income transfers, while mothers who get income
transfers do not work. 138 This income transfer program increases income
equality but decreases incentives to work and thus decreases the social
wealth.
III. THE HARD CASE PARADIGM OF BILATERAL MONOPOLY VS. THE
COASE THEOREM
In the leading law & economics textbook, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF










The equilibrium price and quantity in this competitive market are Pc and Qc. Since the de-
mand curve explains what quantity consumers would be willing and able to buy at every price,
clearly many consumers would be willing to buy some of this product at prices above the
competitive equilibrium price, Pc. The quadrangular area ODEQc represents the total amount
that consumers would be willing to pay for the quantity Qc of this good. The rectangular area
OPcEQc represents the amount consumers actually have to pay for this good. The triangular
area PcDE is called consumer's surplus and represents the amount that consumers would but
do not have to pay. This Figure shows how rewarding individuals according to their produc-
tivity also redounds to the common good. H. VARIAN, supra note 31, at 242-66.
134. See supra note 109 (figures a & b).
135. Id.
136. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-709 (1981).
137. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9831-9852 (1981).
138. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-615 (1968).
139. R. POSNER, supra note 4. "To some, the work of the Chicago school is synonymous
with law and economics." The accompanying footnote says "the most comprehensive presen-
tation of this approach is in Posner .... [ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 3d ed. (1986)] Part
II." Rose-Ackerman, supra note 8, at 237, 254 (2d ed. 1989). See also L. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 693 (2d ed. 1985) (noting Posner as a major contributor).
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law, as we shall see, is to mitigate bilateral-monopoly problems."'"' The
Subject Index in his book, which lists fifteen entries under the heading of
Bilateral monopoly,' 41 attests to the importance of the bilateral-monopoly
problem. The myriad topics which Posner cites as involving the bilateral-
monopoly problem include: eminent domain; 42 nuisance, particularly pol-
lution;143 divided estates in land including landlord-tenant, joint tenancy,
and life tenant-remainderman; 44 relations between salvors and disabled
ships;145 mitigation of damages in contracts; 46 penalty clauses in con-
tracts; 147 specific performance issues in contracts, 48 as a cause of increased
transaction costs in bilateral negotiations in general;' 49 labor-management
negotiations;' 50 transfer of cable television franchises; 15' lender-creditor re-
lations, and by extension principal-agency relationships in general;' 5 2 closely
held corporations;15 3 settlement negotiations; as a cause of externalities and
obstacle to the Coase Theorem.' 54
To Posner, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 55 illustrates the bilateral-mo-
nopoly problem.' 56 In Boomer, the defendant's production of cement inter-
fered with its neighbors' quiet enjoyment of land and vice versa, land
owners' insistence on quiet enjoyment interfered with cement production. A
bilateral-monopoly problem, as present in Boomer, exists whenever two par-
ties need to coordinate their separate activities without dealing with third
parties. Such negotiations are unlike competitive markets in which one can
make agreements with numerous third parties, with or without coordinating
activities.
Although the large number of references to the bilateral-monopoly prob-
lem' 57 indicates that Posner sees the problem as nearly ubiquitous, in most
of these references Posner merely states but does not explain or analyze the
concept. In the few instances in which Posner discusses the concept of bilat-
eral monopoly, the discussion is extremely cryptic. 5 8 Moreover, in the text,
Posner twice coyly hints that the bilateral monopoly interpretation is anti-
thetical to the Coase Theorem interpretation. 59 For example, when discuss-
140. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 55.
141. Id.
142. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 49.
143. Id. at 54-55.
144. Id. at 65-66.
145. Id. at 104.
146. Id. at 106.
147. Id. at 116.
148. Id. at 118-19.
149. Id. at 232.
150. Id. at 300-01, 304.
151. Id. at 363.
152. Id. at 368.
153. Id. at 399-400.
154. Id. at 523.
155. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
156. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 119.
157. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
158. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 54-54, 118-119, 300-01.
159. Id. at 106, 600.
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ing the economic rationale for the contract doctrine of mitigation of
damages, Posner notes:
To give the supplier any remedy that induced him to complete the
contract after the breach would result in a waste of resources. The law
is alert to this danger and, under the doctrine of mitigation of damages,
would not give the supplier damages for any costs he incurred in contin-
uing production after my notice of termination.
But isn't the danger unreal, if the Coase Theorem is true? There are
only two parties, and there is a price for the supplier's forbearing to
enforce his contract rights - indeed a range of prices - that will make
both parties better off. But of course this is just another example of
bilateral monopoly; transaction costs will be high even though (in a
sense, because) there are only two parties. 60
The bilateral monopoly interpretation and the Coase Theorem interpreta-
tions cannot both be correct. The Coase Theorem proposes that when two
separate activities need to be coordinated, outcome of negotiations will be
the same, and efficient, regardless of which party is endowed with the rele-
vant property rights.1 61 The bilateral-monopoly interpretation concludes
that when two activities need to be coordinated, the party who is endowed
with the relevant property rights will have a significant advantage in negotia-
tions; that is, different property right endowments will result in outcomes
that are different, each of which is inefficient. 162
It is apparent from ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW that Posner chose to
minimize technical discussions in order to make the book more readable and
palatable to those not well-versed in economic theory. In addition, since the
theory of bilateral monopoly can be technically complex, Posner's terse dis-
cussion is both understandable and consistent with his minimalist use of the-
ory in general. On the other hand, due to the cryptic nature of Posner's
discussion, his non-economist readers will almost certainly not understand
the extreme importance of the bilateral-monopoly problem.1 63
A. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.164
Boomer is a representative hard common law case because it addresses the
interrelated and entangled issues of distributional equity and efficiency.
160. Id. at 106.
161. Cooter, supra note 35, at 1, 13-15.
162. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
163. Law students in my Law and Economics classes are unable to understand either the
substance or the significance of the bilateral.monopoly problem from Posner's text.
164. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
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Other hard tort cases, 165 as well as hard contract, 166 or hard property
cases167 could easily have been chosen. This section then examines which of
two competing economic paradigms/models, competition or bilateral mo-
nopoly, gives an interpretation that best fits such cases. This section illus-
trates that the bilateral monopoly paradigm/model provides an
interpretation that fits Boomer, and by way of generalization, hard common
law cases, better than does the competition paradigm/model. This section
will also show that the bilateral monopoly interpretation fits hard common
law cases better than does the Coase Theorem interpretation. Articles by
Baumol' 68 and Cooter,169 who proved that "the central version of the Coase
Theorem cannot be deduced from economic assumptions," support Posner's
hints and the analysis of this Article.' 70
In Boomer, the plaintiffs, neighboring landowners in the vicinity of the
defendant cement company, instituted a suit for nuisance, alleging injury to
their property from dirt, smoke, and vibration that emanated from the plant.
The plaintiffs sought both damages and injunctive relief. The New York
Court of Appeals denied injunctive relief and overruled its longstanding doc-
trine granting an injuction for a nuisance which is substantially proven to
damage the complaining party.17' The court held that granting an injunc-
tion literally would cause the cement plant to close at once, even though the
total damage to the plaintiff's property was relatively small in comparison
with the value of defendant's operation.'
72
Why did the court believe it had to jettison its long-standing doctrine, and
165. Eg., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 1789, 494 P.2d 700 (1972)
(See supra note 175 and accompanying text); opart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 41
N.Y.2d 564, 362 N.E.2d 968 (1977) (affirming dismissal of complaint of nuisance where de-
fendant power plant's emissions forced plaintiff automobile service business to cease doing
business); Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. 852 (1879) (confectioner had used a motar and pestle
on his premises for more than 20 years without disturbing his neighbor, a physician; however,
after the physician built a consulting room on his property, the noise and vibration from the
confectioner's activity became a nuisance; held, defendant had not acquired an easement).
166. E.g., Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921) (applying difference
in value standard rather than cost of replacement in determination of damages where contrac-
tor failed to use certain brand of pipe expressly called for in contract to build house); Groves v.
John Wunder Co., 205 Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939) (using cost of completion standard
rather than the difference in the value of land in determining damages where contractor will-
fully and in bad faith breached by failing to leave realty at a uniform grade as specified in the
contract); Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1963) (applying
economic benefit rule rather than cost of performance where economic benefit was only $300
and cost of performance would be $29,000), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963).
167. E.g., United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949) (fair market value of steam tug for
purposes of compensation for government requisition should not reflect enhanced value caused
by the shortage resulting from such requisitioning program); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("In determining the limits within which values incident to property
may be diminished under the police power without compensation, the extent of the diminution
is a fact for consideration); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich.
616, 304 N.W.2d 455, 455 (1981) ("[S]ocial and cultural environments are not matters within
purview of statute governing environmental protection and are outside its legislative intent").
168. Baumol, supra note 36, at 308.
169. Cooter, supra note 35, at 1.
170. Id. at 15.




why is Boomer a hard case? The court implicitly realized that if it granted
injunctive power to land owners, the landowners would be in a monopoly or
"hold-up" position with respect to defendant cement companies. Landown-
ers then could use the economic leverage inherent in an injunction to de-
mand not only compensation for damages done, but also to demand, as the
price of allowing the cement company to operate, all of its profit. 173 This
would be in addition to compensation for actual damages, and would allow
the land owners to redistribute income from the cement company to
themselves. 174
After denying injunctive relief, the court chose to award the plaintiffs per-
manent rather than temporary damages. 175 Permanent damages, which be-
come a "servitude on the land," 176 attempt to compensate landowners for all
past and all reasonably anticipated future harms, and thereby save the ex-
pense of successive law suits. On the other hand, temporary damages, in this
case, would compensate only for past harms and would require the landown-
ers to maintain successive actions at law as further damages are incurred.
Temporary damages would thereby give the cement company an incentive to
research and develop techniques to alleviate future injury. The court made a
crude cost-benefit analysis and chose permanent, rather than temporary,
damages because the court did not believe that the cement industry could
find techniques to eliminate dust and other annoying by-products of cement
production within a reasonable period of time. 177 For the court, the prob-
able reduction of future injury from the temporary damage approach
weighed less than the cost of successive suits necessitated by such
approach. 178
The dissenting judge maintained that by overruling the long-established
rule of granting an injunction when a nuisance causes substantial continuing
damage, "the majority is, in effect, licensing a continuing wrong. It is the
same as saying to the cement company, you may continue to do harm to
your neighbors so long as you pay a fee for it.'' 179 Furthermore, the dissent
argued that once permanent damages are assessed and paid, the incentive to
alleviate the wrong would be eliminated, thereby causing smoke and noise
pollution to continue without abatement. 180 Finally, the dissent asserted
that it is constitutionally impermissible to impose a servitude on land, with-
out consent of the owner, by payment of permanent damages where the con-
tinuing impairment of the land is for private use.181
173. In economic theory, profit is defined as a return to invested capital that is greater than
the long-run competitive rate. The competitive rate is treated as an opportunity cost of doing
business such that profit is any return greater than the opportunity cost of capital. H.
VARIAN, supra note 31, at 321-22.
174. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 122, at 175.
175. 257 N.E.2d at 875.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 873.
178. Id.





Although the court realized some of the difficulties involved in determin-
ing an efficient solution, and understood that unfair distributional conse-
quences would be likely if injunctive power was granted to landowners, the
court failed to recognize other concerns. For example, the majority did not
address the dissenting judge's concern that once the cement company paid
permanent damages, it had no incentive to alleviate damage to landowners.
Nor did the court seem to realize that both parties, not just the cement com-
pany, should be given proper incentives to avoid injuring each other. For
instance, landowners could have been given incentives to take action, such as
using "sound proofing" or air cleaners, which would minimize the damage
done by defendant's operation.18 2 Finally, the court apparently did not real-
ize that it had some, but not complete, freedom to alter distributional conse-
quences without impairing efficiency.18 3
One advantage of studying economic models is that these models explain
when and how considerations of efficiency and distributional equity are re-
lated. The discussion now turns to competition and bilateral monopoly, and
asks which of them best fits Boomer.
B. A Comparison Of Competition And Bilateral Monopoly
Economists attempt to make the general economic theory of supply and
demand 184 fit specific cases by employing models, including the competitive
model or monopoly model. The builders of these models choose assump-
tions, the relevance of which is limited to specific sets of facts.185 Paradigms
are literally examples composed of stylized facts. As mentioned previously,
just as models are more specific than general theory, paradigms are more
specific than models.' 8 6 Paradigms are models with implicit rather than ex-
plicit assumptions.' 8 7 A commodity or stock exchange is the paradigm of
the competitive model which this Section will employ. For ease of exposi-
tion, the main focus will center around economic paradigms; the models and
explicit assumptions that underlie these paradigms will be relied upon only
in the discussion of bilateral monopoly where clarity of exposition requires
the use of the model.
1. The Competitive Paradigm
The competitive paradigm utilized in this section will be an organized
commodity or stock exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange,
182. Baumol, supra note 36, at 311-12; see infra notes 251-80 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 251-80 and accompanying text.
184. See generally, H. VARIAN, supra note 31, at chs. 2-6 (discussion of budget constraint,
preferences, utility, choice, and demand); E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at chs. 2-5; W.
BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 30, at 34-58; P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, supra 38,
at 25-35, 59-63.
185. The competitive model and four assumptions necessary to generate the model are
stated infra note 189; the monopoly and bilateral monopoly models and their assumptions are
stated infra notes 195-98.
186. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 174-76, 187-
91 (2d ed. 1970) (discussion of the nature of a paradigm as used in the scientific community).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
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where contracts are made to buy and sell a standard commodity or shares of
stock.188 A commodity or stock exchange is considered organized in the
sense that all transactions are made according to specific institutional rules
by well-informed traders. A competitive market can be characterized as an
institution in which bilateral transactions are made under conditions in
which each party knows of, and has alternative opportunities to make, other
transactions that are indistinguishable in all material respects from the one
that actually takes place. Therefore, no party to any transaction has eco-
nomic power over, nor can take advantage of, any other party. Consider the
following three properties of competitive markets.
First, opportunistic behavior whereby one party takes advantage of an-
other is illustrated by fraud, duress, monopoly or strategic hold outs, shirk-
ing, and free riding. Perfectly competitive markets 89 rule out this behavior
because each party to any proposed transaction always has many alternative
188. See Section 3A for a discussion of the organized commodity or stock exchange para-
digm of a competitive market. See infra note 189 for the assumptions of paradigm embedded in
the competitive model. In turn, the competitive model is embedded in general economic the-
ory of supply and demand.
189. In addition to the assumptions of general economic theory discussed supra note 53,
the model of perfect competition requires four additional and more specific assumptions: 1) an
infinite number of buyers and sellers implies that small firms are as technologically efficient as
large firms and that no economic agent can exert a perceptible influence on price; 2) standard
or homogeneous products; 3) free resource mobility whereby labor and capital encounter no
barriers to enter or exit any market; and 4) perfect knowledge such that buyers and sellers are
aware of all relevant prices and opportunities. Under perfect competition, all firms are too
small in relation to the total market to affect price. Therefore, each firm accepts the price that
has been determined in the market, PE in the left-hand figure below. Note: all firms are price
takers. All perfectly competitive firms have horizontal demand curves. Such a firm can
double or triple its sales without affecting demand price for its product. Because sales cannot
affect price, the equilibrium of a profit-maximizing firm in a competitive market must occur at
an output level at which marginal cost (MC) equals the price PE of the product. In other
words, the cost of producing one more unit is equal to the revenue from selling one more unit.
P P DVSr me r
i Al I
C PE PRICE =MC C P Ce (Demand) e
I S D
Q E Quantity Q c Quantity
(in lOOs) (in lO00s)
COMPETITIVE FIRM COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY
The long-run supply curve of a perfectly competitive firm is the portion of its marginal cost
curve that extends above the point where the marginal cost curve intersects the average total
cost (ATC) curve, in other words, above the minimum ATC. If the price falls below this point
of intersection, the firm's supplied quantity will in the long run drop to zero. The supply curve
of a competitive industry is derived by summing horizontally the supply curves of all firms in
the industry. Together, industry supply and consumer demand, which is a horizontal summa-
tion of all individual consumer's demands, determine the equilibrium price (Pc in the right-
hand figure above) and quantity (Qc) of a competitive industry. See W. BAUMOL & A.
BLINDER, supra note 30, at ch. 25; E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at ch. 8.
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parties with whom to transact on equal or better terms. In other words,
"You're not the only seller of widgets." Second, because opportunistic be-
havior is impossible, competitive markets are efficient 90 in the sense that:
"Buyers get what they pay for" because buyers are so well-informed about
all possible alternative transactions that they cannot be cheated (shirkers or
lazy individuals manufacture products of known lower quality or charge
higher prices for the same quality due to wasted time in production). In
addition, "Buyers must pay for what they get" because no one can get a free
ride or take opportunistic advantage of information generated by someone
else's effort. 191
Third, government intervention in competitive markets for the purpose of
altering distributional consequences is self-defeating because it impairs the
raison d'etre for markets, their efficiency. 192 For example, assume a legisla-
ture deems widgets a necessity in a competitive market and decrees price
controls in the form of a maximum price on widgets. Widget producers'
profits will decline below the competitive level, so the producers will with-
draw their investment from the widget market and invest in markets not so
controlled. The result of government intervention in the widget market will
be a shortage of widgets. 193 Ultimately, if the maximum legal price is far
enough below the competitively determined price, widget production will
cease altogether. Consider another example: if courts relieve low income
debtors from repayment burdens of contracts incurred in competitive mar-
kets, low income individuals will, as a class, be charged higher rates of inter-
190. "(1) opportunism refers to a lack of candor or honesty in transactions, to include self-
interest seeking with guile; (2) opportunistic inclinations pose little risk as long as competitive(large-numbers) exchange relations." 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANAL-
YSIS AND ANTrFRUST IMPLICATIONS 9 (1975).
191. H. VARIAN, supra note 31, at ch. 28; E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at ch. 15.
192. Id. at 42-47; W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 30, at 64-69.
193. In the Figure below, a shortage will occur if a price ceiling (Pc), which is below the









At a price of Pc, demanders will wish to purchase a quantity equal to the line segment PcB
whereas suppliers will only be willing to supply a quantity equal to line segment PcH at that
price. Line segment HB represents the shortage. Correspondingly, a surplus will occur if a
price floor that is above the equilibrium price is legislated.
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est and will find less available or nonexistent credit. 194
Government intervention in competitive markets for the purpose of
achieving distributive goals is functionally equivalent to, even if morally very
different from, opportunistic behavior. Competitive markets nullify the ef-
forts of opportunistic individuals or governments to alter distributional con-
sequences inherent in markets, due to the voluntary nature of market
transactions, which allow all buyers and sellers to transact in a number of
other markets not subject to opportunism or government control.
2 The Bilateral Monopoly Paradigm
In order to discuss bilateral monopoly, the terms monopoly and monop-
sony must be defined. A monopolist is a single seller and a monopsonist is a
single buyer. A monopoly market is one in where transactions occur under
conditions which allow the single seller to take advantage of many buyers
who cannot buy a product from an alternative seller by restricting supply of
that product in order to create an artificial shortage and raise its price.195
Monopoly markets are also distributionally "unfair". Buyers pay more in
monopoly market than in a competitive market as a consequence of the mo-
nopolist's ability to raise the product's price and thereby unfairly transfer
income from buyers to the monopolist. 196
A monopsony market is one where transactions occur under conditions
allowing the single buyer to take advantage of many sellers who cannot sell
their products to an alternative buyer, by restricting demand for that prod-
uct in order to create an artificial surplus and lower the product's price. 197
Monopsony markets are also distributionally unfair. The single buyer pays
less in a monopsony market than in a competitive market as a consequence
194. Arthur Leff constructed a satiric hypothetical to illustrate this example in his well
known review of Richard Posner's ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1972), Leff, supra
note 7, at 460-61 (1974).
195. H. VARIAN, supra note 31, at 414-24 (1987). E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 280-91.
In the Figure, infra note 198, a monopolist would restrict supply from the competitive quan-
tity, Qc, the monopoly quantity, QM, to in order to raise price from the competitive price, Pc,
to the monopoly price, PM. In order to maximize its profit, a monopolist would produce that
output at which the marginal cost (MC) of producing an extra unit of output is equal to the
marginal revenue from selling another unit, MR = MC. At any output at which marginal
revenue is less than marginal cost, decreasing output increases profit because extra revenue
from the last unit sold will be less than its extra cost. The profit maximizing monopoly price
and quantity are PM and QM.
196. In the Figure, infra note 198, the monopolist's ability to raise price from Pc to PM
allows a transfer of income, measured by the rectangle PcPMAB, from buyers to monopolists.
In addition to the inefficient reduction of output from Qc to QM and the inequitable transfer of
income from consumers to the monopolist, represented by PcPMAB, there is a third detrimen-
tal effect of monopoly is present. The triangle AEF represents the deadweight loss of monop-
oly and symbolizes the value of lost output to both consumers and to producers. H. VARIAN,
supra note 31, at 415-24; E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 297-99.
197. H. VARIAN, supra note 31, at 439-40;. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 441-20.
In the Figure, infra note 198 a monopsonist would restrict demand from the competitive
quantity, QC, to the monopsony quantity, QM, and depress price from the competitive price,
Pc, to the monopsony price, PS. The analysis of a monopsonist is symmetric with that of a
monopolist. In order to maximize profit, a monopsonist would buy that output at which the
marginal cost (MC) of producing an extra unit of output is equal to the marginal revenue from
another unit (MR = MC). The monopsony price and quantity will be Ps and QM.
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of the monopsonist's ability to depress a product's price and thereby unfairly
transfer income from sellers to the monopsonist.198
The most often used bilateral-monopoly paradigm is a contract negotia-
tion between the management of the only factory in town and the represent-
atives of the only union in town. 199 The union of all employees in town is a
198. In Figure 1, the monopsonist's ability to depress price from Pc to Ps allows a transfer
of income, measured by'the rectangle PsPcBF, from sellers to monopsonists. In addition to the
inefficient reduction of output from Qc to QM and the inequitable transfer of income from
sellers to the monopsonist represented by PsPcBF, a third detrimental effect also occurs: lost
output to both consumers and producers. The triangle AEF represents the value of this dead-
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The Figure above labels the supply curve as SS and the demand curve as DD. The price and
quantity that would result in this market depends upon how many individuals or firms are
assumed to participate as sellers on the supply side and how many individuals or firms are
assumed to participate as buyers on the demand side. Consider four different assumptions as
to the number of participants and the models which result: competition, monopoly, monop-
sony, and bilateral monopoly.
In a competitive market operating under the assumption that the demand curve is a horizon-
tal summation of many buyers' demands and the supply curve is a horizontal summation of
many sellers' supplies, the competitive price and quantity would be Pc and Qc.
In a monopoly market operating under the assumption that the demand curve is a horizon-
tal summation of many buyers' demands but that the supply curve is the supply curve of the
single, monopolistic seller, the price and output would be PM and Qm.
In a monopsony market, operating under the assumption that the demand curve is the de-
mand of the single buyer and the supply curve is a horizontal summation of many sellers'
supply curves, the price and output would be Ps and QM.
In a bilateral monopoly market, the demand curve represents the demand of the single buyer
and the supply curve represents the supply curve of the single seller. The price and output that
will result in a bilateral monopoly market is indeterminate in terms of economic theory. In
other words, a theory based upon profit maximization is unable to yield a specific prediction
about price and quantity. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 300-01; W. BAUMOL & A.
BLINDER, supra note 30, at 812. If legal institutions and bargaining power favor the monopo-
list or seller, the price and output are likely to be close or equal to Pm and QM; if legal institu-
tions and bargaining power favor the monopsonist or buyer, the price and output are likely to
be close to Ps and QM; if legal institutions are neutral and if the monopolist and monopsonist
have equal bargaining power, the price and output are likely to be close to competitive levels,
Pc and Qc.
199. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 300. With respect to the prevalence of bilateral mo-
nopoly in the real world, an economist Edwin Mansfield says, "[c]learly, there are few cases of
this sort, except perhaps in labor markets." Id. On the other hand, the Index to Richard
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monopolist because it represents the only seller of labor. The factory's man-
agement is a monopsonist because it serves as the only buyer of labor. The
monopolist must negotiate a contract with the monopsonist. Bilateral mo-
nopoly is a negotiation whereby two parties have no alternative but to deal
with each other, yet each party attempts to take advantage of the other. For
instance, the union is trying to bring management to its knees so that it can
insist on high wages and "featherbedding" work rules; management is trying
to break the union and turn the factory into a sweat shop. If the two parties
cannot agree, the parties may grant a third party coercive power and allow it
to impose a settlement, such as binding arbitration.
Consider the following three properties of the bilateral monopoly: First,
in a bilateral monopoly both parties attempt to behave opportunistically.
Both parties try to exert monopoly power over the other; the parties have
"locked horns". Second, because either party may exhibit opportunistic be-
havior in bilateral monopoly markets, the results, in terms of price and
quantity of output, are indeterminate. 2°° Whether bilateral monopoly mar-
kets result in the competitive price and efficient quantity of output, or tend
toward the monopoly or monopsony price and inefficient output, depends
upon the bargaining power of the parties, and whether legal institutions and
government intervention favor one party or are neutral. Third, government
intervention in bilateral monopoly markets can lead to a variety of possible
results. If legal institutions and government intervention favor neither
party, 20 1 and the parties have similar economic strength, the results from
bilateral monopoly negotiations, in terms of price and quantity of output,
will probably be the same as in competitive markets.20 2
If legal institutions and governmental intervention are biased in favor of
one party or the other, the favored party can exert monopoly power and act
opportunistically over the other. Biases result if, at one extreme, the union
could be enjoined as an illegal conspiracy, 20 3 or at the other extreme, the
union has the legal right to blockade all entrances to the factory during a
strike. In general, depending upon which party is favored by the legal insti-
tutions and government intervention, the results in terms of price and output
will tend toward either monopoly or monopsony, and will therefore be dif-
ferent from competition. In other words, the quantity will be less than the
Posner's ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW lists fifteen entries for bilateral monopoly. R. Pos-
NER, supra note 4, at 654. The difference in Mansfield's and Posner's perspectives on the
prevalence of bilateral monopolies is that Mansfield, an economist, sees the world in terms of
the general or competitive case, whereas Posner, a lawyer, sees the interstitial or bilateral mo-
nopoly case as being ubiquitous.
200. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 300-01; W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 30, at
812.
201. See generally, AMERICAN LABOR POLICY (C. Morris ed. 1987) (collection of essays on
the Wagner Act).
202. In terms of the Figure, supra note 198, the competitive price and quantity would be Pc
and Qc.
203. Eg., Labor Conspiracy Cases, 1806-1842 - Philadelphia Cordwainters 3 DOCUMEN-
TARY HisT. AM. INDUS. Soc'Y. 59 (J. Commons and E. Gilmore eds. 1910) (Philadelphia
Cordwainers' Case - 1806).
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efficient quantity. 2° 4 In sum, if legal institutions and governmental interven-
tion in bilateral monopoly are biased in favor of one party, the transaction
that results can in general be characterized as inefficient and distributionally
unfair.
An optimal solution to the coordination of separate activities of two par-
ties, such as labor and management, would require the two parties to possess
identical interests. Such optimal coordination could occur if the union, ac-
ted as its own boss and owned all of the factory's common stock through its
pension fund.20 5 In that case, the bilateral-monopoly problem would disap-
pear because the worker-owners would have a unity of interests.2° 6
C. Bilateral Monopoly And Boomer
Consider a bilateral monopoly interpretation of Boomer. The court in
Boomer first had to decide which party should win the dispute;20 7 and sec-
ond, the court had to decide whether to protect the winning party's entitle-
ment by a property right enforced by an injunction, or by a liability rule
enforced by damages.208
If a party possesses an entitlement to an object, such as an automobile, a
property right legally protects that entitlement. Another party who wants to
transfer the legal entitlement to herself can only do so if she pays a price
satisfactory to the currently entitled party. The price of the property right
includes the monetary equivalent of the entitled party's subjective or senti-
mental value of the object. Courts enforce property rights with injunctions;
the party who is enjoined is forbidden to interfere with another's property
right unless he or she pays a price satisfactory to the other party.
204. If legal institutions and bargaining power favor one party, it is theoretically possible to
achieve results that are the same as competition in terms of quantity of output but different
from competition in terms of price. In the Figure, supra note 198, if legal institutions and
bargaining power favor the monopolist, and if the monopolist can calculate the relevant supply
and demand curves, the buyer must buy the quantity Qc, the competitive and efficient quantity
but must pay a lump sum equivalent to quadrangle ODEQc. Under competition, the buyer
could buy Qc for the lump sum equivalent to rectangle OPcEQc, thus the overcharge amounts
to triangle PcDE. If legal institutions and bargaining power favor the monopsonist, and if the
monopsonist can calculate the relevant supply and demand curves, then the monopsonist will
require the seller to sell the quantity Qc, the competitive and efficient quantity, but will only
pay a lump sum equivalent to quadrangle OSEQc. Id. Under competition, the seller could sell
Qc for the lump sum equivalent to rectangle OPcEQc such that the undercharge is equivalent
to triangle SPcE. This result is the same as competition with respect to quantity but differs
from competition with respect to price. The result, however, appears an unlikely possibility
because it cannot be achieved unless bargaining power is extremely one-sided and the relevant
supply and demand curves are known, which knowledge is usually very imperfect.
205. See generally 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 190 (discussion of incentive compatibility
within the hierarchical structure of firms).
206. If the labor-management merger produces products which are sold in competitive
markets, it is possible to achieve results which are the same as competition in terms of quantity
of output but may differ from competition in terms of wages. For example, the worker-owners
may voluntarily reduce their remuneration in order to free additional funds for investment to
and maximize their long term income. Alternatively, worker-owners may decide to increase
their present wages at the expense of future growth and income.
207. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089-1090 (1972).
208. Id. at 1106-10.
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On the other hand, if a party has an entitlement to a an object protected
only by a liability rule, another party who wants to transfer the legal entitle-
ment to himself can do so if he pays a price determined by a court. For
instance, party who negligently destroys another's automobile must "buy" it
at a price set by a court, or a government which uses eminent domain to
"take" property for public use must compensate the owner at an amount
determined by a court. An entitlement protected by a liability rule usually
does not include the entitled party's personal or subjective valuation of the
object. "Just as the initial entitlement is often decided upon for distribu-
tional reasons, so too the choice of a liability rule is often made because it
facilitates a combination of efficiency and distributive results which would be
difficult to achieve under a property rule." 209 In sum, an entitlement pro-
tected by a liability rule is worth less in monetary terms than one that is
protected by a property right.
The Boomer court determined that the landowners were entitled to dam-
ages, 210 yet refused to protect their entitlement by a property right.211 The
court granted an injunction, but stipulated that the injunction should be va-
cated upon payment of court-determined permanent damages.212 The court
appartently realized that if it granted landowners an injunction without such
an alternative, the landowners would have monopoly power over the cement
company. Strictly speaking, the landowners would have had monopsonistic
power over the plant because collectively the landowners are the single
"buyer" of pollution.213 Landowners would use their monopoly power not
only to set a price that would redistribute income from the cement company
to themselves, but also to cause the cement company to reduce its output
below the efficient level.
If the court decided that the cement company should prevail, the decision
would be tantamount to giving the cement company a right to pollute pro-
tected by a property right. The cement company then would have monopoly
power over landowners who, in order to reduce pollution, would have to pay
a price satisfactory to the cement company. As the single "seller" of pollu-
tion, the cement company could use its monopoly power to set a price that
would redistribute income from landowners to the company, thereby reduc-
ing the rental value and use of landowners' property below the efficient
level. 214
Clearly, a property right solution to the bilateral-monopoly problem gives
the party with the property right monopoly power over the other party.
Thus, a property right solution to the bilateral-monopoly problem will usu-
ally differ from competitive results in terms of price and quantity. Such a
result can be characterized, in general, as both inefficient and distributionally
209. Id. at 1110.




213. In terms of the figure, supra note 198, the price and quantity would be Ps and Qm.
214. In terms of the figure, supra note 198, the price and quantity would be PM and QM.
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unfair. The Boomer court implicitly realized the monopoly problem inher-
ent in the property right approach, and chose a liability rule approach. The
court thus chose to award damages, a remedy which facilitates a combina-
tion of efficiency and distributive results usually not attainable by a property
rule in situations where bilateral-monopoly problems exist.215
Assuming that the Boomer court had perfect knowledge, how should it
decide the proper entitlement and liability rule? A court with perfect knowl-
edge initially would begin by making a cost-benefit analysis. (a) The court
would consider the research and development feasibility to control smoke
and noise pollution, and (b) weigh the increased cost of cement production
due to the installation of smoke and/or noise pollution control equipment,
against the benefit in increased rental value of its neighbors' land caused by a
reduction in pollution damage. Finally, (c) the court would weigh the land-
owner's increased cost to install sound proofing and/or air cleaners, against
the benefit of the cement company's increased income from lower pollution
damage costs. Because these cost-benefit analyses are interrelated, their effi-
cient values must be determined simultaneously. In other words, the sepa-
rate activities of cement production and quiet enjoyment of property cannot
be efficiently coordinated, unless each party considers the detrimental effect
of its activity on the other and takes appropriate action to minimize the cost
of such detrimental effects.
It is possible, for example, that the efficient coordination of landowning
and cement production requires that the cement company install smoke and
215. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 207, at 1110. In his article, Calabresi points out
that since either of the two parties, "injurer" or "victim," to the suit can win and receive an
entitlement, and since two possible remedies of property right or liability rule exist, there must
be four possible combinations. Id. at 1116. The fourth and most difficult combination to
imagine is where the injurer is entitled to damages. In terms of Boomer, the fourth combina-
tion would occur if the cement company, who is the injurer, has an entitlement to pollute
which is protected by a liability rule. The victim could restrict the injurer's activity but would
have to compensate the injurer for the injurer's damages, such as foregone profits. Although
this fourth possibility entitling the injurer to damages is uncommon, the court used this very
solution in Spur Indust., Inc. v. Del E. Webb v. Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972)
(en banc). The judge who decided this case apparently was not aware of Calabresi's recently
published article. Conversation with Calabresi (Hamline Law School, St. Paul, Minn., aca-
demic year 1984-1985).
In Spur, a development of suburban homes expanded until it abutted a cattle feed lot that
had been built many years prior to the housing development and miles from any habitation.
The developer sued, alleging nuisance resulting from the smell and the flies. Despite findings
that the developer had "[c]ome.to the nuisance", the court enjoined the feed lot operator. Id.
at 707-08. The court, however, then remanded the case to determine the feed lot operator's
damages. Id. at 708.
An interesting sidelight to the Mendeleev-like deduction of Calabresi, that a fourth combi-
nation and cases like Spur that exemplify it must theoretically exist, concerns how Calabresi
was lead to this deduction. Calabresi's book, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS is one of the seminal
works of modem law and economics. G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970). In
response to this book, Frank Michelman wrote an article suggesting three rules to pollution
problems. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs,
80 YALE L.J. 647 (1971). In response to Michelman's response, Calabresi said that "the very
statement of [Michelman's three] rules in the... framework..." in which Calabresi discussed
them (entitlements, property rights, and liability rules), "suggest[ed] that something is miss-




dirt pollution control equipment and that landowners install sound proofing.
It might be cheaper for the cement company to install scrubbers on its
smoke stacks, which prevent soot from polluting the air, than for land own-
ers to paint their houses more frequently and suffer discomfort, increased
medical costs, and lost employment due to respiratory disorders caused by
air pollution. Thus, the cement company may be the cheapest cost
avoider216 of smoke pollution. Landowners may incur cheaper costs by
sound proofing their homes, than those costs incurred by requiring the ce-
ment company to redesign its equipment in order to stop vibration and noise
pollution. Thus, the landowners may be the cheapest cost avoiders of noise
pollution. If the cement factory bears the burden of both smoke pollution
and noise reduction, the cost it incurs would probably be greater than the
sum of the costs incurred by both parties if the court ordered the cement
company to reduce smoke pollution and the landowners to reduce the detri-
mental effects of noise pollution.
Efficient coordination of land ownership and cement production maxi-
mizes the combined income from cement production and land rentals. In
addition, efficient coordination of the activities balances the detrimental ef-
fect of each activity on the other by minimizing such effects in the cheapest
manner. Thus, efficient coordination results in a combined income from the
two activities that is greater than the combined income from uncoordinated
activities, the difference being a joint-income surplus.
A three dimensional figure would be required to show graphically how the
simultaneous determination of the three-prong cost-benefit analysis results in
a joint-income surplus. If it is assumed, however, that the court in Boomer
correctly concluded that research and development would unlikely yield new
technology within the reasonably foreseeable future, then this process can be
simplified. Simply ignore part (a) of the three-prong cost-benefit analysis
addressing research and development and determine simultaneously only the
efficient coordination of (b) and (c). This assumption simplifies but does not
change the essential nature of the analysis. The simultaneous determination
of the remaining prongs of the two cost-benefit analysis, (b) and (c), and the
income surplus that results from efficient coordination can be shown in a
216. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 155. See G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS,
supra note 215, at 139, 162.
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two-dimensional table. 217
Assuming that the court in Boomer correctly concluded that research and
development would unlikely yield practical results within a reasonably fore-
seeable time, the court could have implemented an efficient solution by not
requiring the company either to spend money on research and development
or to compensate landowners for damage from vibration and noise pollution.
Landowners, the cheapest cost avoiders of noise pollution, thus would pay to
sound proof their homes as an investment to increase the rental value of
their homes. The court would then adopt a liability rule for smoke pollution
and thereby give the cement company an incentive to reduce smoke pollu-
tion to the efficient level. This level, however, is not zero since the total
elimination of pollution would probably require unacceptable increases in
the price of cement.
The liability rule to reduce smoke pollution performs two functions.
First, the rule provides the cement company with an incentive to adopt the
efficient solution. Second, the rule distributes the joint-income surplus re-
sulting from the efficient solution. The joint-income surplus results when the
mutually interfering activities take account of each other's detrimental ef-
fects in the cheapest possible way.218
Whether the joint-income surplus from efficient coordination of the ce-
ment production and land owning activities is distributed more to landown-
ers than to the cement company, or vice versa, depends upon the liability
217. LAND OWNERS
No Pollution Sound Air Air Cleaners &
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Maximum joint-income surplus occurs if according to Table 1, the cement company specializes
in smoke pollution control and landowners specialize in noise pollution control.
218. Cooter, supra note 35, at 7-9.
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rule or shadow price219 that the court uses to charge for smoke pollution
damage. For example, a rule that charges a high price for smoke pollution
damage necessarily will reduce the income from cement production and in-
crease land rental values. Although more than one liability rule for smoke
pollution damage that will both coordinate land owning and cement produc-
tion efficiently and distribute the joint-income surplus from such coordina-
tion exists, not all liability rules will efficiently coordinate the two activities.
Moreover, if these activities are inefficiently coordinated, joint-income sur-
plus resulting from efficient coordination will not be achieved. 220
One efficient rule may charge a constant dollar price per pound of carbon
residue.221 Another efficient rule initially may charge a low per pound price
for pollutant but then raise the price for each additional pound of pollu-
tant.222 The two rules, however, yield different distributions of income to
land owning and cement production activities.223 The first rule would shift
more of the joint-income surplus to the land owning activity and less to the
cement activity224 and vice versa for rule two.
A third pollution abatement rule, like the first rule, charges a constant
dollar price per pound of pollutant, but charges a different price, so that the
efficient amount of smoke pollution will not result.225 Thus, efficient coordi-
nation of the two activities and the distribution of the joint-income surplus
from such coordination are to some extent, but not totally, independent of
each other.226
Finally, consider the result if the landowners and the Atlantic Cement
Company merged to become one firm called Boomer & Atlantic (B & A,
instead of B v. A ). If one firm owns both activities, the firm will internalize
the mutual or external interference of land owning and cement production
219. Shadow prices are theoretically determined "accounting rules" that serve as, but are
not, actual prices. See H. VARIAN, supra note 31, at 506.
220. In order to understand the conclusion that not all liability rules will both efficiently
coordinate the two activities and distribute the maximum joint-income surplus, the Figure,
supra note 198, compares the effects of three smoke pollution abatement rules.
221. In the Figure, supra note 198, the constant charge for a pound of pollution could be
Pc per pound.
222. In Figure 1, supra note 198, the price per pound of pollution rises with the supply
curve SS, starting at S per pound and rising for each pound of pollution thereafter according to
the slope of SS, so that at a quantity of pollution equivalent to Qc the price per additional
pound of pollution is Pc. Both rules result in the efficient amount of pollution (Qc pounds of
pollutant residue). Id.
223. In the Figure, supra note 198, the first rule would charge a total damage cost equal to
the rectangle OPcEQc, whereas the second rule would charge a lesser total damage cost equal
to the quadrangle OSEQc.
224. The amount of joint-income surplus shifted would be SPcE. See supra note 198
(figure).
225. In terms of the Figure, supra note 198, any rule which charges a constant amount per
pound of pollutant which is either greater or less than Pc would result in an inefficient amount
of smoke pollution - either too little or too much pollution. A liability damage rule that set a
price higher than Pc would inefficiently coordinate land owning and cement production be-
cause it would make cement production relatively too expensive and land owning too inexpen-
sive; the rule would result in too little pollution. Correspondingly, a constant charge for
pollution less than Pe would result in too much pollution in terms of efficient coordination.
226. See supra notes 220-25.
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activities with each other. Management would coordinate the two activities
and internally resolve any disputes within the firm of B & A.
Obviously, B & A are interested in coordinating these activities efficiently
so as to achieve the joint-income surplus resulting from such coordination.
B & A could coordinate land owning and cement production efficiently and
could distribute the joint-income surplus from such coordination 227 by man-
agement fiat. 228 A major difference between the institutional context in
which a single management merges and coordinates the two activities, and
the institutional context in which the court, as in Boomer, effects coordina-
tion, is that the merged firm generally would have better access to informa-
tion than a court. Therefore, the firm could more efficiently coordinate the
two activities.
As should be clear by now, a great deal of information about and coordi-
nation of, the land owning and cement production activities is required in
order to achieve efficient coordination and maximization of the joint-income
surplus. In cases that involve the bilateral-monopoly problem, courts usu-
ally possess insufficient information to coordinate activities efficiently or to
achieve the maximum joint income solution. Courts must, therefore, make
intelligent guesses as to the general outlines of such solutions. The bilateral
monopoly paradigm demonstrates that simplistic property rules cannot in
general achieve efficient coordination; damage compensation remedies may
have consequences for efficiency and distribution which differ from those of
competitive markets. Moreover, the distribution of the surplus income from
coordination is to some extent, but not totally, independent of efficiency
consequences.
D. Bilateral Monopoly vs. The Coase Theorem
The bilateral monopoly interpretation fits Boomer better than the competi-
tive or the Coase Theorem interpretations. This conclusion can be genera-
lized to all cases where parties must agree on how to coordinate separate
activities by dealing strictly with each other and not third parties.
1. Bilateral Monopoly Better Fits BoomerThan Does the Competition
Although the competitive model fits general laws, run-of-the-mill contract
cases, and the institutions that support such contracts in the sense of provid-
ing an interpretation which has a good fit with legal practice, it does not fit
cases in which two parties must agree on how to coordinate their separate
activities when they cannot deal with third parties. These cases are unlike
competitive markets because each of the parties to the dispute cannot con-
227. B & A can evenly divide the surplus income between the activities; it can divide the
surplus on the basis of their relative shares of the combined values of land and cement plant, or
it can divide the surplus by any other arbitrary criterion. It could also use the surplus to
diversify if the rate of return is higher in other industries.
228. "[T]he distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism."
Coase, The Nature of The Firm, ECONOMICA 386, 389 (1937). Within a firm, market transac-
tions are eliminated and a heirarchical structure and internal control processes are substituted
in their place. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 190, chs. 2-4.
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trol the other's opportunistic behavior by threatening to transact with third
persons should they fail to reach an agreement. If one party attempts to take
undue advantage of the other in such cases, the only recourse is for the latter
party to threaten the use of the coercive power of a court to dictate a settle-
ment. This procedure is similar to a bilateral monopoly stalemate that par-
ties settle by binding arbitration.
2 Bilateral Monopoly Better Fits Boomer Than Does the Coase Theorem
In his well known article, The Problem of Social Cost,2 29 Coase suggested,
but never explicitly stated, what has become known as the Coase Theo-
rem.230 Coase left the job of stating exactly what the theorem says to
others.231 This Article briefly explains Coase's article, and then discusses
the construction of Coase's remarks by others. The bilateral monopoly in-
terpretation will then be shown as superior to the Coase Theorem interpreta-
tion of cases in which two parties must agree on how to coordinate their
separate activities in a situation when it is not possible to deal with third
parties.
In one sense, the Coase Theorem can be seen as an attempt to rescue
Adam Smith's invisible hand theorem232 from the charge that the visible
hand of governmental intervention is required in order to solve problems like
the one presented in Boomer, where mutually interfering activities generated
by individual self-interested behavior reduce social welfare. When Coase
wrote his article, government intervention in the form of taxes and subsidies
represented the prescription for dealing with problems like pollution. No
one challenged this procedure. 233
Coase attacked these prescriptions on two grounds. First, whether termed
mutually interfering activities, externalities, 234 or social costs, Coase main-
tained that such phenomena should not be viewed in a uni-directional man-
229. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
230. "I am told that he stated the theorem explicitly in a seminar at the University of
Chicago." Cooter, supra note 35, at 14 n.10.
231. Coase's failure to state the theorem in his article resulted in a great deal of confusion
that surrounds the Coase Theorem. Robert Cooter systematically describes several alternative
formulations in THE COASE THEOREM, in THE NEW PALGRAVE (1985).
232. This theorem states that if every individual acts so as to maximize her self interest,
social welfare, however defined, will be maximized as well. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (1937).
233. Baumol, supra note 36, at 307-09.
234. An externality occurs when an activity undertaken by party A imposes a cost or con-
fers a benefit on party B for which party A is not charged or compensated by (or through) the
price system. D. DEWEY, MICROECONOMIcs: THE ANALYSIS OF PRICES AND MARKETS 221
(1975). If a steel factory, A, pollutes air and streams with the incidental by-products of steel
production, smoke and slag, many B's suffer damage because of the reduction in air and water
quality. It is often not feasible to compensate these individuals because of: 1) the transaction
costs involved in dealing with large groups of persons, most of whom suffer small individual
damage; 2) the problem of proving causation, for instance, which factory caused damage to
which individuals; and 3) the problem of determining the extent to which individuals have
suffered damage. Because the cost of damage is not considered in the market for steel, the
damage is said to be external to that market or represent an externality. However, pollution
may affect other markets. Air pollution causes increased purchases of air purifiers, house
paints, and window cleaners. Water pollution increases the cost of producing pure water. W.
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ner or one way causation. 2 35 Every social cost is inherently reciprocal in
nature.236 Although the social cost of pollution would disappear if the ce-
ment company in Boomer closed, the social cost of dirt, smoke, and vibra-
tion emanating from the cement plant would also disappear if neighboring
landowners moved away. "This position, though at first glance very odd
(the murder victim too is then always an accessory to the crime), grows
more persuasive as one considers it further. ' 237 For example, if an individ-
ual builds a house in a business district where steel-producing factories are
located, the government should neither tax nor assess damages against the
factories for smoke damage to the home and its occupants, but should re-
quire the homeowner to locate elsewhere. 238 The doctrine of "coming to a
nuisance" in the law of torts recognizes the reciprocal nature of mutually
interfering activities and refuses relief in these situations.2 39 Coase's first
point that it is often impossible to say that either party is the cause of mutu-
ally interfering activities due to the reciprocal nature of social costs, has
made a lasting contribution to law and economics; it provides the theoretical
foundation for the economic analysis of alternative legal rules and institu-
tional structures. Coase's point is also entirely consistent with the bilateral
monopoly interpretation.
Second, Coase analyzed several cases and constructed several examples to
conclude, although never explicitly, that: (1) if the law clearly specified prop-
erty rights one way or the other, and (2) if transaction costs,240 defined as
the costs of making contracts between those who have the rights specified in
their favor and those who don't, are zero, then no matter whom the law
favors, the bargaining between the parties will result in the efficient coordi-
nation of their activities.24 1 Self-interested bargaining allegedly will coordi-
nate cement production and land owning efficiently. This results because
both parties may possibly gain from such coordination which produces a
joint-income surplus.242 One succinct formulation of the theorem is as fol-
BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 30, at 634-38. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 482-87; H.
VARIAN, supra note 31, at ch. 31.
235. The externality approach to social costs emphasizes one-way causation.
236. Coase, supra note 229, at 2.
237. Baumol, supra note 36, at 308.
238. Id. at 317-18. Cooter, supra note 35, at 12-13.
239. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 88B, at 634-35 (5th
ed. 1984).
240. The transaction costs of bargaining refer to the cost of communicating among
the parties (including the value of time used up in sending messages), making
side payments (the cost of the transaction, not the value of what is exchanged),
and the cost of excluding people from sharing in the benefits exchanged by the
parties (free riders]. In the case of contingent commodities [those involving risk
and uncertainty such as insurance], the cost of obtaining information on the
actions of the players is also treated as a transaction cost, so the inefficiencies
from moral hazard and adverse selection are swept under the blanket of transac-
tion costs.
Cooter, supra note 35, at 16.
241. See infra note 243.
242. In order for transaction costs to be low enough for bargaining to be possible, the
number of parties involved must be small. This is an important caveat. The Coase Theorem is
not applicable to those situations involving large numbers of parties. E. MANSFIELD, supra
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lows: "If transaction costs are zero the structure of the law does not matter
because efficiency will result in any case."'243
Bilateral monopoly provides an interpretation that better fits the facts and
conclusions of law in cases like Boomer than does the Coase Theorem for
three reasons. First, in order for the Coase Theorem's simplistic property
right approach to result in efficient solutions in casep like Boomer, the theo-
rem must implicitly assume that the opportunistic behavior of the party who
has the monopoly power inherent in the property rights is either: (1) con-
trolled by the myriad alternatives of some mythical market, which clearly
does not exist, since the parties must deal with each other and no others; (2)
that a single firm coordinates and manages the mutually interfering activi-
ties, in which case there would be no dispute and no case for the court to
decide; or (3) that the party with the monopoly power inherent in the prop-
erty right would not act opportunistically but would bargain cooperatively.
With respect to the last alternative, Cooter demonstrated that even if trans-
action costs are zero, the Coase Theorem is false because it cannot be de-
duced from the usual economic assumption of individual self-interested
behavior. 244 The Coase Theorem requires the assumption of cooperative be-
havior.243 This assumption is contrary to economic theory's general as-
sumption of self-interested behavior, as well as the particular assumption
that a monopolist will exploit its monopoly power to the fullest extent so as
to maximize profit. The deus ex machina involved in the Coase Theorem's
implicit requirement of either nonexistent markets, coordinated manage-
ment, or counter-assumed cooperation suggests that it should be called the
Dr. Pangloss Theorem.
note 3, at 509. Large number externalities, social costs, are the most socially troubling type
and cause such problems as acid rain and smog. In Boomer, the Court was troubled by the
possibility that its decision in the case would have wide ranging ramifications on parties not
before it. 257 N.E.2d at 871.
243. Cooter, supra note 35, at 16, citing Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defec-
tive Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1655,
1665 (1974).
244. Cooter demonstrated that the Case Theorem requires cooperative behavior, which is
contingent on agreement by the parties to a rule for the distribution of surplus income that
results from such cooperation. If such agreements always occurred as the Coase Theorem
suggests, litigation would never occur because the parties would always settle their differences.
Cooter, supra note 35, at 17.
To emphasize the extremely optimistic and Panglossian assumption concerning cooperative
behavior necessary if the Coase Theorem is true, Cooter constructed the polar opposite and
equally false theorem (his conclusion), the Hobbes Theorem, which represents extreme pessi-
mism concerning the cooperative potential of individuals: "Private bargaining to redistribute
external costs will not achieve efficiency unless there is an institutional mechanism to dictate
the terms of the contract." Id. at 18. The Hobbes Theorem assumes that people will exercise
their worst threats against each other and identifies the impediment to agreement with the
absence of a third party who has the power to coerce the parties to compromise because it can
threaten to dictate the distribution of the stakes authoritatively.
245. "The Coase Theorem represents extreme optimism about private cooperation ..
Cooter, supra note 35, at 19. "The error in the bargaining version of the Coase Theorem is to
suppose that the obstacle to cooperation is the cost of communicating, rather than the strategic
nature of the situation. Bargainers remain uncertain about what their opponents will do, not
because it costs too much to broadcast one's intentions, but because strategy requires that true
intentions be disguised." Id. at 23.
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Second, given that mutually interfering activities are reciprocal in nature,
Baumol demonstrated that both parties must be given proper incentives to
act efficiently. 246 A property rule which favors one party will not generally
result in efficient coordination of two activities because the favored party will
not have sufficient incentives to take into account the detrimental effect of its
activity on the other party. 247 Thus, Baumol showed that the Coase Theo-
rem's extreme view, that courts are free to alter distributive consequences of
economic activity without impairing efficiency, is generally incorrect. 248
Third, the court's decision in Boomer supports the conclusion of the bilat-
eral-monopoly interpretation. The Boomer court expressly refused to adopt
the Coasian property-right solution for reasons suggested by the bilateral-
monopoly interpretation. 249 In order to achieve efficient and distributionally
fair results in cases in which parties must coordinate their separate activities
without dealing with third parties, courts are often required to resort to lia-
bility rules or damage remedies and to other forms of equitable relief, rather
than merely to declare declarations of property rights.
IV GOVERNMENT ACTION To ACHIEVE MAXIMUM SOCIAL WEALTH
Two basic principles control government action of a primarily economic
character. First, both courts and legislatures should attempt to achieve the
same goal, that of maximizing social wealth. This principle is contrary to
the generally accepted view expressed by Posner, who argues that courts and
legislatures have totally different functions and goals with respect to eco-
nomic policy. 250 In Posner's view, courts through common law adjudication
are exclusively concerned with efficiency, 251 while legislatures are concerned
with distributional equity252 and interest groups politics. 253
Section Two, however, showed that distributional equity and efficiency are
the two ingredients of social wealth. Maximization of social wealth requires
that these two ingredients be optimally mixed. Section Three domonstrated
that when courts adjudicate hard common law cases, their decisions have
implications for both distributional equity and efficiency, not just efficiency
alone. Clearly, therefore, when courts adjudicate hard common law cases
they should not merely be concerned with efficiency alone, but should be
engaged in social wealth maximization as defined in Section Two. Courts
should attempt to use their limited freedom to alter distributional conse-
246. Baumol, supra note 36, at 308-09, 311-12.
247. Id.
248. "The closer the world approaches the Coasian world of zero transaction costs, the
closer law comes to playing a purely distributive function." (footnote omitted) Rose-Acker-
man, Law and Economics:" Paradigm, Politics, or Philosophy, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 235 (N.
Mercuro, ed. 1989).
249. See text accompanying note 203.
250. R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 505-06.
251. Id.
252. Id. at ch. 16.
253. Id. at 496-99. "Although the correlation is far from perfect, judge-made rules tend to




quences, in order to achieve their conception of a society which maximizes
social wealth.
Because Congress drafted the federal antitrust statutes254 with constitu-
tion-like generality, Congress has in effect granted courts common law
power to police and restructure monopolized markets in order to ensure the
markets are reasonably competitive.255 The court's exercise of antitrust
power has significant implications for both efficiency and distributional eq-
uity. Because a monopolist can take great advantage of buyers' lack of alter-
native sellers, a large scope for opportunistic behavior exists in monopolized
markets. Monopoly markets are both inefficient and distributionally unfair.
By creating an artificial scarcity of the monopolized product, monopolists
cause an inefficient allocation of resources. The market produces too little of
the monopolized product and too much of other products.
Political conservatives often argue not only that efficiency considerations
alone are sufficient to justify antitrust policy, but that efficiency is the only
justification for antitrust policy.256 This assertion is not only unsupported
by statutory history and intention, 257 it has questionable theoretical support.
The General Theory of the Second Best 258 states that if a number of monopo-
lized or imperfectly competitive markets exist in an economy, and the anti-
trust authorities are in a position to break up some but not all of the
monopolies, one cannot be sure that efficiency will be increased. 25 9 More-
over, empirical studies on the efficiency impact of monopolies on the Ameri-
can economy estimate only a small resultant impact, consisting of one or two
percent of the national income.260 An equally important rationale for anti-
trust policy is its use as remedy for the distributional inequity resulting from
monopolized markets. Without such a policy, buyers would pay more than
they should as a consequence of the monopolist's ability to raise the prod-
uct's price and thereby unfairly transfer income from buyers to the monopo-
list.26I Empirical studies estimate that the wealth transfers due to monopoly
tend to be very large.262
Courts have used this antitrust power to restructure markets in order to
dissolve monopolies into a number of competitive firms.263 Courts have also
254. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 12-27.
255. A. Neale & D. Goyder, THE ANTITRusT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 440, 442 n.1 (3d ed. 1980).
256. R. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADOX 81-89 (1978).
257. Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEORGE WASH. L. REV.
1, 16-20 (1982); D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW. 139-44 (1959).
258. Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11
(1956-57).
259. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at 493-94.
260. W. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 130-32 (3d ed.
1990); K. CLARKSON & R. MILLER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 124-27 (1982).
261. See supra notes 184-206 and accompanying text.
262. D. Greer, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY 171 (2d ed. 1987).
263. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) and P. AREEDA & L.
KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, CASES AND TEXT (4th ed. 1988).
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enjoined opportunistic or anticompetitive behavior of monopolists.264
Dewey pursuasively argues that courts have used their power to restructure
monopolized markets sparingly because innocent shareholders and workers
will experience the severe redistributive impact of such restructuring. 265 In
other words, social-wealth maximization in monopoly cases often forces the
courts to make difficult judgments as to the efficiency and distributional con-
sequences of their decisions.
The second principle of government action to achieve social wealth holds
that neither courts nor legislatures should interfere in competitive markets if
markets are in fact competitive and not afflicted by market failures or
chronic instability. 266 As discussed earlier, 267 government intervention in
competitive markets for the purpose of altering their distributional conse-
quences is self-defeating because it impairs the raison d'etre for markets,
their efficiency. Such intervention to achieve distributive goals is function-
ally equivalent to opportunistic behavior. For example, legislation that ben-
efits "rent-seeking" special interests, such as price supports for farmers,
import quotas for clothing manufacturers, military bases for local interests,
etc., reduces efficiency and is inconsistent with social wealth
maximization.2 68
This second principle does not mean that courts and legislatures should in
all cases refrain from interfering in matters of contract. Courts or legisla-
tures often justify government intervention if any of the major assumptions
underlying the competitive model are not met. For example, intervention is
justified if one party to a contract has significant bargaining or monopoly
power, or if significant informational asymmetries exist. Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 269 involved the sale of an automobile in which the
contract effectively disclaimed all warranties. 270 The Supreme Court of New
264. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
265. [T]hey [courts] are not convinced that the exercise of monopoly power which
has been acquired by means neither actionable nor indictable per se violates the
law to an extent justifying its elimination without a sympathetic attention to the
position of workers and stockholders whose interests may be adversely affected
by trust busting. This view does not regard vested interests in monopoly as bona
fide property rights merely by virtue of their established character, but it does
assume, however inarticulately, that possible public gains must be weighed
against possible private losses and that the more problematical the public bene-
fit, the greater the weight of private claims.
D. DEWEY, supra note 257, at 247-48.
266. There should also be no market failures or market instabilities. H. VARIAN, supra
note 31, at chs. 31-32. E. MANSFIELD, supra note 3, at ch. 16. For an argument in favor of
government rent stabilization due to the instability in the housing market, see Cirace, Housing
Market Instability and Rent Stabilization, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1275 (1989).
267. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
268. See E. Phelps, POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT 187-88 (1985);
Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust Cases, 61 TEXAS L.
REv. 481 (1982); Tullock, The Welfare Cost of Tarrifs, Monopolies, and Theft, V. W. Econ. J.
224 (No. 3, June, 1967).
269. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
270. In fact, the manufacturer only agreed to replace defective parts which in the manufac-
turer's opinions are defective and which defect is discovered within 90 days of delivery or
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Jersey held that the disclaimer was contrary to public policy and was there-
fore void.27 1 Moreover, the court stated, "it is our opinion that an implied
warranty of merchantability, chargeable to either an automobile manufac-
turer or a dealer, extends to the purchaser of the car, members of his family,
and to other persons occupying or using it with his consent. '272 In support
of its decision, the court noted both the information asymmetry between the
buyer and seller 273 and the lack of a competitive market in the automobile
industry at the time of the automobile sale.27 4 In the 1950s, the American
automobile industry market structure was not competitive but rather a
"tight oligopoly. '275
The United States Congress has also passed laws affecting contracts. For
example, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 276 limits the seller's power to
disclaim or modify implied warranties arising under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.277 Informational asymmetries, competitive imperfections, 278 and
the duty of Congress to provide an institutional framework which makes
competitive markets possible, justify this Act.
Finally, consider the savings and loan scandal, which resulted from the
deregulation of the industry, as an example of a failure by Congress to fulfill
its responsibility to provide an institutional framework for efficient, competi-
tive markets. Government abandoned control over the type of investment
that depositor's funds could finance, while at the same time retaining its role
as insurer against losses to depositors.279 Thus, the government allowed sav-
ings and loan managers to invest in unsound investments and engage in op-
portunistic behavior without fear of market discipline.280 The savings and
loan scandal implicates both distribution, costing tax payers billions of dol-
lars,281 and efficiency, destabilizing of real estate and mortgages markets.282
With respect to the savings and loan industry, the federal government
4,000 miles of use, whichever event occurs first, on condition that the buyer return the parts
with transportation charges prepaid! 161 A.2d at 73-74, 78-79.
271. Id. at 95.
272. Id. at 100.
273. "The limitations of privity in contracts for the sale of goods developed their place in
the law when marketing conditions were simple, when maker and buyer frequently met face to
face on an equal bargaining plane and when many of the products were relatively uncompli-
cated and conducive to inspection by a buyer competent to evaluate their quality." 161 A.2d
at 80.
274. "The form warranty is not only standard with Chrysler but ... it is the uniform
warranty of the Automobile Manufacturers Association. . . . [T]he "Big Three" (General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) represented 93.5% of the passenger-car production for 1958 and
the independents 6.5%." 161 A.2d. at 87.
275. A "tight oligopoly" is defined as a market in which "[t]he leading four firms, com-
bined, have 60-100 percent of the market; collusion among them to fix prices is relatively
easy." W. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 14 (3d ed. 1990).
276. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1975).
277. Id.
278. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J. LAW & ECON.
461, 464 (1974).
279. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1724, 1728 (1986), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-73, Title IV, § 407,
Aug. 9 1989, 103 Stat. 363.
280. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1990, at D7, col. 5.
281. Id. Jan. 25, 1990, at DI, col. 3.
282. Id. Jan. 22, 1990, at D7, col. 4.
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clearly failed to fulfill its responsibility to provide an institutional framework
composed of efficient and competitive markets.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to effect a synthesis of law and economics ac-
ceptable to both lawyers and economists. Lawyers and economists possess
conflicting values and employ different methodologies. The value conflict
between lawyers and economists concerns the proper criterion to evaluate
governmental action of a predominantly economic character. Once it is
demonstrated that total social wealth is a function of both distributional eq-
uity and efficiency, construction of a wealth maximization criterion that is
efficient and has a strong claim to distributional equity resolves this value
conflict. In addition to resolving the value conflict between lawyers and
economists, both courts and legislatures can employ this criterion, thus mak-
ing it unnecessary to construct different theories for each branch of
government
To form the hard case paradigm, a synthesis of the different law and eco-
nomics methodologies combines hard common law cases, which are difficult
because questions of distributional equity and efficiency are interrelated and
difficult to disentangle, with the economic paradigm or model of bilateral
monopoly, which best explains such cases. Bilateral monopoly provides an
interpretation that fits hard common law cases better than does the Coase
Theorem interpretation. A true synthesis of law and economics, as opposed
to an economic analysis of law, must include a method for analyzing distri-
butional consequences as well as efficiency consequences of court and legisla-
tive decisions.
1190 [Vol. 44
